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11. Introduction
Ever  since  I  first  came across  the  subject  of  cultural  property  in  a  course  about  law and
history politics,  I  have discovered a world that has only come to seem more complex the
further I have studied it. Earlier, I had known nothing about the complexities of the nature
of the collections in the great “universal museums”1, and about what a heated debate there
was about the claims for restitution. After having studied the subject further, there was
something in the back of my mind about the debate that bothered me, but I could never
quite  pinpoint  what  it  was.  Something  about  how  the  debate  never  seemed  to  move
forward, and how the different sides of the argument were defined and how they argued in
reality made it seem to me that the debate did not play out in the same way as the writers
made it seem. It also puzzled me that I felt that, even despite appearing to be at the
different ends of the spectrum, the different sides often argued using very similar
arguments. Then a few years later, while contemplating the subject of my Master’s thesis, I
was taking a course on international law and hearing about Martti Koskenniemi’s view
about the indeterminacy of international law. According to it, international law has an
argumentation pattern where each party takes positions opposing one another, but during
the course of the discourse each party inevitably flips around the other’s argument and uses
it for their own position and vice versa, theoretically ad infinitum – and suddenly it struck
me how incredibly similar this was to the way the cultural property debate functioned. I
knew I had found an angle to the thesis I had previously been missing.
Cultural  property  has  come  to  have  an  immense  value  to  people  almost
everywhere. Everyone involved in the debate – and almost everyone at least in the Western
world – “have agreed to a worldview in which culture has come to be represented as and
by ‘things.’”2  In recent years also the intangible expressions of culture have come to be
valued and protected more, but in the large scale it seems that tangible heritage is still seen
as the most important manifestation of a culture.
1 Nor had I heard of the term “universal museum”.
2 Handler, 1985, p. 215
2This  is  also  why  the  restitution  of  cultural  property  has  become  such  a  hot
topic in recent years, even decades. Nations feel that they have a right to the cultural
property created by their predecessors, that it is something that is inherently theirs in both a
legal-moral  sense  and  a  more  cultural  sense.  That  another  state  displays  (and  gains,  for
example, the advantages of tourism from) something that feels so fundamental to the first
country, it creates a feeling of being wronged. The debate is heated further by the demands
of the postcolonial nations hoping to claim some redress for colonialism, a time when the
colonial powers heavily increased their collections of cultural objects from around the
world. At the same time, the nations holding the objects feel they have the law on their
side, and feel that not only are their rights being threatened just as much, but also that
morally the claims from the source country are not any more justified than the holding
country’s right to the objects.
There has, however, been a rising trend of restitution for several decades
now, perhaps even rising since the 90’s. The most important change happened in 1970 with
the  UNESCO Convention  on  the  Means  of  Prohibiting  and  Preventing  the  Illicit  Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which changed the international
legal system to be more biased towards restitution in most cases – though only those that
have come to being after the Convention. The trend of restitution is related to the general
public view having slowly but steadily shifted in favor of the restitution movement.
However, the trend has also meant that those – usually institutions – who are in possession
of cultural property from other nations, have on occasion felt the need to dig their defenses
even deeper, perhaps feeling overly pressured at times for restitution even when there
really is no cause, all the while certain people especially in source nations have taken an
overly offensive stance towards these institutions holding the objects, causing friction and
impairing fruitful collaborations. It is, in other words, important that the discussion stays in
good spirit.
Cultural property also touches on every nation. National museums house
objects of (cultural) importance from the nations’ past, and everywhere there are
collections, monuments and other objects celebrating the historical, cultural and artistic
achievements of the peoples. And although not all nations have been subject to the removal
of  their  cultural  property  –  or  been  the  one  removing  them  –  this  subject,  too,  can  have
effects in surprising places. For example, in Finland some years ago, a collection of copies
from the Russian Tsarist government mainly from the 19th century was rediscovered in the
3Helsinki University Library. This collection included also copies of many Hebrew
language books, several of which had been lost in the many purges against the Jewish
populations especially in World War II.3 In addition, not all dislocation of cultural property
happens outside national borders. Even a country like Finland, whose cultural property has
mainly been without interest internationally, has had its share of (systematic) internal
removals  of  cultural  property  by  the  government,  especially  in  the  region  of  Karelia
(though some of it was also acquired on the side of the Soviet Union).4
Because there is so much interest, meaning and importance invested in
cultural property and its allocation, it is no surprise that there are also ways in which it is
used for historical-political gains. This is something that is important to keep in mind in the
discussions,  and  it  is  quite  difficult  to  be  fully  separate  from.  Cultural  property  is  also
strongly ambiguous in its meaning, so that while for one person it means something purely
aesthetic and artistic (or has no meaning at all), or perhaps celebrates the achievements and
unity of humanity as a whole, to another person the same piece or its allocation might be a
sign of imperialist attitudes and a display of perceived superiority.
There are countless angles one could approach the cultural property issues
from, and here I can only scratch the surface. One important angle is seeing cultural
property or heritage as a human right5 (or a community right); one could approach the
problems from ethics;6 it  is  also possible to look at  it  from a point of view of economics
and international (art) trade;7 or as a minority issue8. In addition, these are issues that touch
all the corners of the world, and people in a myriad of different cultures, ways of life and
social situations – and usually all of them have a different understanding of what it is that
makes cultural property important, and what cultural property means in the first place.
That  is  also  why it  is  vital  to  delimit  one’s  approach  to  the  subject.  In  this
paper I am only focusing on cultural property (as defined in chapter two) as opposed to
cultural heritage in general, and in cultural property I have left out, for example, human
3 Greenfield, 2007, p. 220
4 Arhippainen, 2009, p. 57
5 See for example Alderman, 2011; Mifsud Bonnici, 2009
6 See for example Merryman, 1998a
7 This is an angle that many participants in the discussion take. See for example Merryman, 1998b;
Merryman, 1995;
8 This relates especially to indigenous peoples, such as the Native Americans and the Aborigines of Oceania.
See for example Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, 2010
4remains9 and archaeological material and focus instead on works of art – including
sculptures and paintings, but also to some extent books and other manuscripts. Both of the
aforementioned types of cultural property that were left out of this study would bring
additional issues that could not adequately be considered in the space available here. In
addition, geographically I have limited myself to European cases – either with objects that
originate from Europe, or objects that are from outside of Europe but are now situated in a
European state (that has been responsible for the object’s extraction from the state of
origin). Finally, I have (aside from some general considerations) left out items in private
ownership and focus purely on objects currently located in so-called universal museums.
This, again, helps focus more on the argumentation without having to bring in lengthy
consideration regarding national and international regulations on private property, the rules
on bona fides ownership and other such matters that would require a study of their own.
It seems that focused academic research of cultural property (especially the
cultural property debate) is quite a recent phenomenon – only in very recent decades has
there been actual methodical research put into the fundamentals of the topic. Earlier, it has
usually been more purely a question of general and academic debate, but not proper
scientific research. This is also why in my study there are several ambiguities and general
considerations I feel I need to address before I can focus on the main questions of research.
1.1. Research questions and methodology
As something that touches on the lives of most people in the world, cultural property is
certainly something of value and worth researching. It is also an area that has many
ambiguities and differing values, which means that a lot more research is needed. I also
feel that there is some confusion as to the nature of the discussion surrounding it. It seems
that many of the participants in the debate do not understand the indefinite nature of the
discussion and the rhetoric in it. Yet it is vital to understand the way the discourse works in
order to get results from it.
In the thesis I study the debate surrounding the demands for restitution of
cultural property.  There are several cases where the debate has been going strong for
decades, or even, in some extreme cases, centuries. The fundamental goal of the study is to
9 This especially is an area of cultural property best explored separately, as there are many rights and
problems involved that are not relevant in other types of cultural property. On human remains as cultural
property, see, for example, on the so-called Kennewick Man, Owsley & Jantz, 2002; Gerstenblith, 2002
5find out why it is that these debates have been able to continue for so long without any
conclusion or results. This will be done by studying the structure and comparing and
analyzing the rhetoric involved in the argumentation between cases, and then applying the
results to the theory of international law as a language as presented by Martti
Koskenniemi. There are also certain contradictions and ambiguities involved in central
concepts  of  the  field,  and  I  will  attempt  to  clarify  some  of  these  concepts,  as  well  as
whether the different approaches to the allocation of cultural property are really as separate
as they seem.
Is this a legal historical study? According to Kekkonen, the essence of legal
historical research is in the analysis of legal change.10 Although actual law does not take a
central stage in this study, I do not consider it a non-legal study. It deals with the structure
and rhetoric of a debate that has participants from all aspects of science and the general
public. Yet, at the same time, at its core are undeniably legal issues. The allocation of
cultural property, like any property – as cultural property is, for the most part, currently
treated – is a legal issue where the law needs to be considered even if it is not directly
addressed. A good deal of the debate has also to do with reasons to potentially supersede
the law – especially morality. And such a consideration needs to take the law into account.
It also has a great deal to do with law and legal history in that it is a matter of power, which
naturally has important legal implications. The ‘history’ part in ‘legal history’ also plays an
important part in this study, as not only is the restoration argumentation always, in part,
inescapably historical, I feel it is necessary to include purely historical considerations in
the study to better comprehend the discourse as it  is  now, not only as a debate about the
best allocation of the objects for their sake but also as a debate about historical (potential)
injustice and its restoration. That is why this study does qualify as legal historical study.
The analysis of legal change is in relation to the development of the concept of cultural
property,  as  well  as  especially  in  the  analysis  of  (the  lack  of?)  change  in  the  cultural
property restoration debate, although in that sense – as analysis of a self-perpetuating
discourse – this approach cannot be carried throughout the text.
Due  to  the  nature  of  the  thesis  and  its  subject,  it  does  not  –  and  cannot  –
systematically follow usual legal historical methodology. Obviously this study does not fit
among the purely legal methods such as doctrinal research – even if fitted to a legal-
10 Kekkonen, 1997, p. 131
6historical approach – as it deals very little with the functioning of laws or the justice
system. For this reason, the study is not ‘internal legal history’ – that is, “the study of legal
doctrine and its processes.”11
So, it seems the study is rather ‘external legal history’, the study of law in
context.12 However, the external legal history view is very inclusive and cannot on its own
offer any methodology. Hence, further narrowing is needed, this time in the division of
“law &” and “law as ...”, as explained by Fisk and Gordon.13 We can see that the study
does not fit the “law &” approach, first and foremost because, again, its primary target of
study is not, in itself, law, but rather the debate surrounding it. In addition, the “law &”
approach has a tendency to perpetuate “the idea that, even though law is situated in society,
law is distinct from society and can, or must, be studied in relation to it.”14 In the view of
this study, the law is merely one aspect of the discourse. The “law as ...” view of legal
history is, however, more suitable, albeit still slightly problematic. In the view of this
study, the view of law is mainly “law as part (or result) of the cultural property debate”.
This thesis does not, however, offer any conclusions from the nature of law itself.
But this study also includes elements that are not fundamentally legal-
historical. Those aspects of the study could be included in the category of ‘socio-legal
studies’ – if the term is interpreted in its widest meaning where it includes an extremely
wide range of approaches from very empirically and social science oriented approaches to
feminist and critical legal studies, and an equally wide range of subjects from purely
legalistic studies to the views regarding law in entertainment.15 In this sense, I believe this
study  fits  well,  as  it  places  a  heavy  emphasis  on  the  view  of  law  as  a  part  of  a  larger
discourse in society overall. However, this way the socio-legal studies can hardly be called
methodology, but rather a loose collection of approaches to studying legally-oriented,
societal  subjects.  If  the  term  is  defined  more  narrowly,  closer  to  pure  social  studies,  the
thesis falls off the definition, as it does not follow the more empirically oriented
methodology in social sciences.16 In From Apology to Utopia, Koskenniemi speaks of
regressive analysis, investigating discourse by going backwards to its deep-structures; a
deconstructive method, “a general outlook towards analysing intellectual operations
11 Handler, 2013, p. 86
12 Id., p. 86
13 Fisk & Gordon, 2011, pp. 519-527
14Id., p. 520
15 Cowney & Bradney, 2013, pp. 35-42
16 Id., pp. 35-36
7through which the social world appears to us in the way it does;”17 and holism, discussing
theory and doctrine as a whole.18 As my thesis relies on Koskenniemi’s work in studying in
a similar manner the debate surrounding cultural property, all these depictions necessarily
also  fit  my study  –  albeit  that  Koskenniemi  has  already  paved  a  lot  of  the  way.  Though
such an approach may be eclectic, I feel that it does not mean that the results of the study
are any weaker. Such a style lacking a uniform method (or “style as method”) is far from
unheard of, supported especially in critical legal studies,19 including Koskenniemi – not to
mention that some have rejected the desirability of method altogether.20
1.2. Structure
There are several complicated and ambiguous aspects in key terms in the cultural property
discussion,  and  there  is  no  one  universal  definition  of  them available.  This  is  why,  even
though a precise definition is not possible, I will begin (after this introduction) in chapter
two by explaining how I use the terms ‘cultural  heritage’ and ‘cultural  property’.  This is
followed by an explanation of two fundamental approaches towards cultural property:
‘cultural nationalism’ and ‘cultural internationalism’. In some ways, the search to define all
these terms will also continue throughout the thesis.
In  chapter  three  I  will  look  into  the  birth  and  development  of  cultural
property and the attitudes toward it in Europe. I will do this especially through the lens of
the  history  of  plunder  of  art,  as  many  of  the  issues  in  the  cultural  property  field  are  the
result of the thousands of years of plunder, especially during warfare. During this chapter, I
aim to trace the roots of the idea of cultural property and to better understand the idea of it
and why we care about it, and to understand how the current situation of globally scattered
cultural objects has come to be. The chapter will focus especially on moments in history
that, when contrasted to one another, reveal change in attitudes towards the central issues
and  the  way  the  different  themes  are  viewed.  The  history  of  cultural  property  is  not  a
history of sudden changes and great individuals who shape the concepts and ideas of the
field. Instead, the changes are gradual, visible often only by comparing attitudes on a
longer timeframe, and there are perhaps even less than a handful people who can be said to
have individually had a great impact on the attitudes towards the allocation of cultural
17 Koskenniemi, 2005, p. 6
18 Id., pp. 6-7
19 See for example Koskenniemi, 1997; and Minkkinen, 2013
20 Feyerabend, 1975
8property, or who have actively and loudly campaigned for changes in attitude. Rather, the
changes have appeared side by side with gradual changes in societal attitudes and morality
on a large scale.
The fourth chapter focuses on the current debate. In it, I will attempt to
specify the most common and most important arguments in the cultural property debate,
and  analyze  the  rhetoric  as  they  appear  in  the  use  of  these  arguments.  This  will  be  done
through focusing on certain high-profile cases that exemplify key elements of the different
arguments and contrast the many-sidedness that these elements may have. Especially the
Parthenon Sculptures case will be prominently featured due to both its massive influence
as the most debated restitution case and its extremely multifaceted nature.
In chapter five, I will continue to explore certain themes that will be alluded
to in the previous chapter, regarding cultural property as something beyond self-contained
objects that are valued because of their inherent traits, but rather, first, as a utility for
history  politics  (or  memory  politics),  and  second  as  a  way  of  continuing  traditions  of
imperialism. The chapter aims to show that although it is often the purported aim of those
in the debate to see and have cultural property as something pure and apolitical, in truth it
is impossible to separate cultural property from politics.
Chapter six will then continue to connect these previously raised points and
compare them to the views of international law of Martti Koskenniemi as presented in his
work From Apology to Utopia.  First,  I  will  briefly  explain  the  central  points  of
Koskenniemi’s theory as it relates to international law, then in the second part I will apply
the theory to the debate surrounding cultural property. I will attempt to show that, in fact,
the debate surrounding the restitution of cultural property follows in great deal the same
patterns as international law discourse, and attempt to find reasons for it.
After this, chapter seven will present some alternative approaches to cultural
property  in  either  its  definition  or  attitudes  towards  it,  as  well  as  contemplating  on  their
possible impacts in regards to breaking the apparently endless cycle of debate in the field
now (without making assumptions on whether such a cycle is a negative thing or not). In
the final chapter I will present some concluding remarks on the paper.
92. Definitions
2.1. Cultural Heritage and Cultural Property
2.1.1. Cultural Heritage
We often see the terms cultural “property”, “heritage”, “goods” and “objects” interchanged.
There is no single, universal definition for any of these terms. Although in common
parlance they generally refer to the same things, their exact definition and legal regime
(alienability, exportability etc.) are to be sought in national legislation, or in international
conventions.
Therefore such definitions and legal regimes vary from State legislation to State legislation,
or from treaty (international convention) to treaty. Generally, the word "property" has a
legal background (linked to "ownership"), while "heritage" stresses conservation and
transfer from generation to generation. No particular culture-oriented connotation
characterizes "good" and "object".21
Cultural heritage and cultural property are not simple terms. There are no exact definitions
of them in law or in literature, but rather more general descriptions that leave a lot open. It
could be said that there are as many definitions of the terms as there are people talking
about them. According to John Henry Merryman, “[a]ny attempt at a definition will reveal
that the cultural property category is heterogenous.”22 In fact, perhaps because of its
multifaceted nature, especially the term ‘cultural heritage’ often goes undefined.
Cultural heritage and cultural property are on occasion used quite
synonymously (especially in the early stages of the development of the terms – in the first
half  of the 20th century – as well as in common parlance), but in reality there is quite an
important difference between them. In the most common sense of the terms, cultural
property should be seen as a subcategory of cultural heritage. In short, cultural heritage
includes an extremely wide variety of matters, both tangible and intangible, that are
important to humanity, while cultural property is more specifically culturally important
items.  In  the  original  formulations  of  the  term,  ‘cultural  heritage’  was  not  yet  really
separated from ‘cultural property’, and included what we now mainly understand as
specifically cultural property – that is, physical objects that have great significance to
human culture23. The idea of cultural heritage has, however, constantly grown over the
21 UNESCO Handbook, p. 4
22 Merryman, 2005, p. 11
23 I use the term ’human culture’ because in the formulations of most of the international conventions, the
importance  of  the  subject  can  be  seen  as  relating  to  either  local  cultures,  or  of  a  more  general  view  of  a
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decades, first including different types of physical objects, then expanding to intangible
heritage, such as certain types of cultural institutions and traditions, as well as natural
landscapes.24
To try to explain cultural heritage and cultural property (at least in a legal
sense), it is probably best to begin by looking at different international conventions and
how the ideas have developed in them. Interestingly, although already the 1954
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflict (Hague 1954)
refers to ‘cultural heritage’, the term is not defined in a legal document until 1964, in the
International Charter on the Conservation and Restoration of Sites (Venice, 1964) – while
the term ‘cultural property’ had been defined in documents decades earlier. In defining
cultural heritage, Venice 1964 has the following to say:
Imbued with a message from the past, the historic monuments of generations of people
remain  to  the  present  day  as  living  witnesses  to  their  age-old  traditions.  People  are
becoming more and more conscious of the unity of human values and regard ancient
monuments as a common heritage. The common responsibility to safeguard them for future
generations is recognized. It is our duty to hand them on in the full richness of their
authenticity. ...
Article 1.
The concept of a historic monument embraces not only the single architectural work but
also the urban or rural setting in which is found the evidence of a particular civilization, a
significant development or a historic event. This applies not only to great works of art but
also to more modest works of the past which have acquired cultural significance with the
passing of time. ...
Article 3.
The intention in conserving and restoring monuments is to safeguard them no less as works
of art than as historical evidence.25
Although these passages still convey a much more narrow view of cultural heritage than
today, focusing on monuments, they still portray several key points in cultural heritage.
Cultural heritage is about the traditions of culture and identity of the peoples. The notion of
“unity of human values” (though no doubt questionable) is also important, portraying the
importance of cultural heritage to humanity as a whole, not just to those whose native
heritage it is (which is also explicitly stated in Hague 1954, saying it is “of great
common culture of humanity. It is never explicitly said whether there is a preference over particular cultures
or humanity in general.
24 Vecco, 2010, pp. 321-324
25 Venice 1964
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importance for all peoples of the world”26). In Article 1, it is noted that of cultural
importance aren’t only the greatest pieces of art, but also more modest ones, that hold other
types of significance. As said by Marilena Vecco: “[i]n this regards, mention was made of
value, evaluation, evidence that are of artistic and historic interest, cultural interest and
interest of cultural property.”27 Article 3 expands on the values that cultural heritage holds
– it is not only the artistic values that make cultural heritage important, but the way the
objects act as reminders of history and sources of historical knowledge.28 There is more to
cultural heritage than meets the eye.
Less than a decade after the Venice Charter, in 1972, the idea and importance
of cultural heritage would be solidified in the Convention Concerning the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention). The Convention does not include
cultural property items in it, rather focusing on more immovable things – but still expands
the category into the context and surroundings of the subject at hand. Importantly, the
Charter parallels cultural heritage with natural landscapes (“natural heritage”, as the name
says), revealing the gradual shift towards the intangible aspects of heritage as we
understand it today.
In the following decades, the idea of cultural heritage would further develop
in international documents, such as the 1975 Declaration of Amsterdam: “[a]part from its
priceless cultural value, Europe's architectural heritage gives to her peoples the
consciousness of their common history and common future. Its preservation is, therefore, a
matter of vital importance”29, which is a further turn from not only emphasizing the
scientific and aesthetic values that the heritage represents, but also the cultural identity and
consciousness of the people. This social aspect culminated in the Burra Charter in 1979,
which explicitly includes not only the “aesthetic, historic, scientific” values, but also the
“social value for past, present or future generations.”30 It also moves further away from
simply listing the subjects of protection (as cultural heritage law is in great deal about the
26 Hague 1954, preamble
27 Vecco, 2010, p. 322
28 In reality, however, it is not quite as simple as it would seem, as there is a great deal of politics involved in
what these different heritage objects represent and which of them are allowed to survive in the first place.
This is discussed further in chapter 5. In addition, David Lowenthal has quite persuasively argued that, in
fact, heritage is the opposite of history (see in general Lowenthal, 1998).
29 Jokilehto, 2005, p. 25, quoting Amsterdam Declaration, Congress on the European Architectural Heritage,
Amsterdam, 21-25 October 1975
30 Burra 1979, art. 1
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protection of cultural heritage) and towards a system of a more subjective (though
communal) recognition.31
Finally, the most recent inclusion into cultural heritage came in the
Convention in the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2003). As the
name suggests, this convention expanded the protection of cultural heritage to not only
tangible subjects, such as monuments and landscapes, but also the intangible aspects of
culture:
For the purposes of this Convention,
1. The “intangible cultural heritage” means the practices, representations, expressions,
knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces
associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize
as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from
generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to
their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a
sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human
creativity...32
This inclusion of intangible heritage was vital because of the limited importance on the
material heritage in many cultures. The earlier focus on material (or even monumental)
heritage was notably Eurocentric. In countries like Japan, the whole basis of the notion of
heritage is first and foremost immaterial.33 In addition to purely intangible tradition, even
the attitude to monuments is very different. According to Marilena Vecco, for example for
the Japanese the interest in the material is minimal, but rather they are interested in the
knowledge imbued in the object’s creation:
The Japanese temple of  Ise,  the greatest  of  the temples of  the Shinto religion,  is  made of
wood and has completely preserved all its perpetuity, thanks to an identical and integral
renewal process. Every 20 years, that is, generation after generation, the temple has been
completely  reconstructed  for  more  than  twelve  centuries.  The  temple  remains  the  same,
using the same type of wood but it is continually renewed without undergoing any material
or spiritual changes.
This approach depends on the cyclic vision of history, characteristic of
oriental civilisations, which allows a sort of reversibility of time. While the western
philosophical approach as regards conservation manifests itself in the preservation of the
historic monument, the oriental one tries to use the monuments to preserve the very spirit
they represent.34
31 Vecco, 2010, p. 323
32 Paris 2003, art. 2
33 Vecco, 2010, p. 324; Harrison, 2013, p. 95
34 Id., p. 324
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All in all, it is clear that the definition of ‘heritage’ is constantly evolving and spreading
into new types of representations. This means that it is also very difficult, if not impossible,
to define comprehensively beforehand, but is rather a constant process of re-evaluation and
reinvention. In addition, the definition of heritage must take into account not just the
European view, but also the many different ideas of culture globally, that often differ
greatly from those in the Western view.35 Of course, the more inclusive the definition is to
be, the vaguer and less helpful it also becomes.
2.1.2. Cultural Property
The terms ‘cultural property’ and ‘cultural heritage’ both appeared in international
documents for the first time in the Hague 1954 convention, though only cultural property
was given a separate definition. It was defined as “movable or immovable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people...”36 and  continues  with  a  list  of
examples such as monuments, archaeological sites, works of art, books and so forth.37
Arguably the most important convention in the field, the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (UNESCO 1970) was more specific in its definition of cultural
property. It also brought the important aspect of each state defining for themselves which
items belong to their cultural property, as long as they fit to the wide range of categories
set in the article. These categories include, for example, all the traditional types of works of
art, objects of historical interest and archaeological material, but also archives, collections
or samples of biological or other such scientific interest. 38 In the convention, one can also
see the emphasis on ‘property’, which further differentiates the idea of cultural property
from cultural heritage – it is not only that physical things are cultural property, they really
are the property of someone or something.
Many international documents follow among very similar lines. However, the
1976 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural
Property has a more descriptive definition of cultural property that attempts to describe
more the spirit of the subject. It also leaves the final definition to the states: “'cultural
35 Id., p. 324
36 Hague 1954, art. 1
37 Id.; on developments before Hague 1954, see Jokilehto, 2005, pp. 4-15
38 UNESCO 1970, art. 1
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property' shall be taken to mean items which are the expression and testimony of human
creation and of the evolution of nature which, in the opinion of the competent bodies in
individual States, are, or may be, of historical, artistic, scientific or technical value and
interest, including items in the following categories...”39 following with a list less detailed
than the one in the 1970 UNESCO convention (which is exhaustive, instead of exemplary).
2.1.3. Non-legal Definitions
Finally, the way cultural property and cultural heritage are used in academic discussion
have their own nuances when compared to the international documents. For example,
several writers have emphasized the rhetorical differences in the terms ‘heritage’ and
‘property’: “[i]n the debate over cultural properties, the language we use reflects our
conceptions of the main issues in that debate and sets into place the sorts of remedies that
are taken to be relevant to resolving that debate.”40 In this approach, the relationship
between cultural heritage and cultural property is not the same as in the legal texts, but
rather they usually are seen as overlapping, competing terms, the difference being in the
way they are addressed. In such a case, it seems ‘intangible cultural heritage’ is a different
category, with ‘cultural heritage’ its tangible counterpart, though it is rarely clearly
defined. As Lyndel V. Prott says: “cultural property, in my view, necessarily carries with
the phrase a whole baggage of associations and implications, in particular, the view in
common law ... that property and ownership rights clearly authorize exploitation,
alienation ... and exclusion of others from access – all elements that, in modern heritage
law, may well be restricted”41 and argues instead for the use of the term ‘heritage’. So, in
short, the term ‘cultural property’ shows the objects being seen as a category of property
alongside others, while ‘cultural heritage’ emphasizes the way the items are passed on
through generations as something external to the view of property rights. Heritage is also
more culturally inclusive, a global term, while cultural property has a distinctly Western
connotation of the idea of property.42
It is also important to realize that the debate is approached from many
different (more or less scientific) angles – which may not always be adequately separated
39 UNESCO 1976, art. 1
40 Warren, 1999b, p. 14
41 Prott, 2005, p. 226
42 Prott, O’Keefe, 1992, pp. 309-312
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from each other, but which bear important effect on the way the entire problem is
understood and attempted to be resolved. As said by Karen J. Warren:
In important ways, the language people use reflects their conception of themselves and
their world. If the language used is primarily the language of law, the conception of what
counts as the relevant issues in a dispute will tend to be given in terms of what the law
permits or requires. If the language used is primarily the language of morality, the relevant
issues in a dispute will tend to be viewed as normative moral issues, that is, issues of right
and wrong, moral rules and responsibilities, moral virtues and vices. And if the language
used is primarily what some philosophers (e.g. the later Wittgenstein) refer to as “ordinary
language,” or as what others might refer to as “common sense,” then the legal and ethical
issues in a dispute will tend to be viewed as relevant to the extent that they do or do not get
at what ordinary language or common sense dictates.43
All the different languages discussed in the passage above are ways in which the debate in
cultural property is often approached, though they are not, by far, the only approaches, and
they each lean towards their own usage of ‘cultural property’ and ‘cultural heritage’. Often,
‘cultural property’ is strictly legal terminology.44 Because the terms have such ambiguous
meanings both in different approaches and in subjective terminology, it is important to
separate the different approaches from each other, and this is also why “it is important that
every scholar spells out his own usage”45.
Although what has been described above is the generally accepted view, this
has not prevented slightly varying or even completely alternative views from also
emerging (and, as was suggested above, it seems everyone has their own perspective on the
finer details). In addition, there have been many suggestions presented for alternative
approaches towards these matters to fix certain issues that arise from the traditional views
of cultural heritage and property. Some of these will be discussed later, in chapter 7. As for
a strict definition, as suggested by Tatiana Flessas, “[t]he search for any definition, much
less a definition that could include all kinds of claims regarding ‘cultural property’, may be
mistaken.”46 Although there are countless attempts at explaining cultural property in a way
that would settle the question in a satisfactory way, “[t]he seemingly exhaustive legal
definitions are the location of gaps, paradoxes, inconsistent values, and sudden switches of
focus.”47 Flessas suggests, instead, that the true essence of cultural property is not in any
definition of the object (in fact the object itself can be quite meaningless), but rather in
43 Warren, 1999a, p. 209
44 Prott, O’Keefe, 1992, p. 319
45 Prott, 2005, p. 226
46 Flessas, 2003, p. 1095
47 Id., p. 1095
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certain structures (of thinking) that attach to the object meaning about “truths” regarding,
for example, culture, and life overall – though in a way that is never fully satisfactory, and
that always leaves the observer looking for something more.48
In this text, I use ‘cultural property’ in what I believe to be the most common sense – as a
subcategory of ‘cultural heritage’ which includes the tangible heritage, while ‘cultural
heritage’ includes also the intangibles as a very open category. I will, however, often prefer
to use the term ‘cultural object’ for much the same reasons as Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, who
writes that “[t]he term ‘cultural property’ places emphasis on the property law aspects of
cultural expressions.”49 However, although I am generally speaking about physical objects,
for me this term also holds the possibility for a more loose interpretation of the subject, for
example as a collection or theoretically as something intangible. Finally, although some
recognize the terms as being value-loaded, for me terms like ‘restitution’ are primarily
neutral, and much like Vrdoljak, I will use them interchangeably. I will, however, avoid
such terms as ‘repatriation’ because it is a term very easily seen as making a statement on
its own.
2.2. Cultural Internationalism & Cultural Nationalism
Cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism are terms developed by John Henry
Merryman in his 1985 article Thinking about the Elgin Marbles,50 which defines different
approaches to the issue of the correct location of cultural property. According to him, there
are two different attitudes that people take in cultural property. First is what he calls
“cultural nationalism”, the idea that cultural property belongs in the nation of origin. The
other is “cultural internationalism”, the idea that cultural property is the property of all
mankind and its allocation should be decided by certain more universal principles.51 This
is, of course, only a rough division of the different actors in the debate – but it is one that
has been for the most part accepted as the two primary categories, even though many –
including Merryman himself – have since supplemented it with finer categories.52
48 Id., passim. Flessas’ views are further explored in chapter 7.
49 Vrdoljak, 2008, p. 7
50 Merryman, 1985. It is good to note that Merryman himself supports the cultural internationalist view.
51 Id., pp. 1910-1921
52 See Merryman, 1998b, pp. 9-13; and for example Francioni, 2011, pp. 9-10
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“Cultural property internationalism” was, according to Merryman, first
solidified in an international treaty in Hague 1954. It was not a new idea, though –
Merryman traces its roots to, for example, the Lieber Code, the code of conduct for the
Union  troops  in  the  American  Civil  War,  as  well  as  the  18-19th Century  French  writer
Quartremère de Quincy, and all the way to the ancient Greek writer Polybius.53 In Hague
1954, the internationalism is exemplified in the preamble, stating:
Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever
means damage to the cultural property of all mankind since each people makes its
contribution to the culture of the world;
Considering that the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance to all the
peoples of the world and that it is important that this heritage should receive international
protection;54
It is the emphasis on the whole of mankind that creates the difference from cultural
nationalism. Internationalism cares primarily about other things than the original
“nationality” of the object. In situations where there case for return is not legally and
morally clear, “Merryman advances three internationalist principles - preservation,
integrity, and access - that assist in determining the appropriate allocation of cultural
property”.55 Preservation means protection of the object from damage or destruction.
Speaking of the Elgin Marbles, Merryman states, that “[i]f the Marbles are destroyed,
people of all cultures will be deprived of an important part of their cultural heritage” and
“damage short of destruction ... threatens the same value.”56 Integrity  is  also  quite  self-
explanatory: any work of art or other cultural object should be as intact and whole as
possible – the object loses value (aesthetically, scientifically or monetarily) if some of it
has been separated.57 Finally the third principle, distribution and access, is about the
availability of the pieces.  This principle holds that since cultural  property is  important to
all the peoples of the world, cultural property should be available all around the world, “so
that all of mankind has a reasonable opportunity for access to its own and other people’s
cultural achievements.”58
Cultural  nationalism,  on  the  other  hand  –  as  defined  by  Merryman  –
emphasizes the national right to cultural heritage. According to Christine K. Knox,
53 Merryman, 2005, pp. 13-18; Merryman, 1986, pp. 834-836
54 Hague 1954, preamble
55 Sljivic, 1998, p. 414
56 Merryman, 1985, p. 57
57 Id., p. 58
58 Id., p. 59
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“cultural nationalism views cultural heritage as nation or state specific, and therefore
assumes that cultural property rightfully belongs in its country of origin.”59 For Merryman:
In its truest and best sense, cultural nationalism is based on the relation between cultural
property and cultural definition. For a full life and a secure identity, people need exposure
to their history, much of which is represented or illustrated by objects. Such artifacts are
important to cultural definition and expression, to shared identity and community. 60
However, Merryman is, in the end, very skeptical of this side of cultural nationalism,
saying that in practice it is, in fact, usually merely a tool for nations to argue for their own
personal gain and retentionist policies.61 He also reminds, that “[i]t is not self-evident that
something made in a place belongs there, or that something produced by artists of an
earlier time ought to remain in or be returned to the territory occupied by their cultural
descendants, or that the present government of a nation should have power over artifacts
historically associated with its people or territory.”62
According to Merryman, cultural nationalism’s most important legal
manifestation is the UNESCO 1970 convention. Cultural nationalism itself is traceable to
the rise of nationalism in general.63 Although it had been already present in earlier
conventions, UNESCO 1970 is prominent in this regard due to its importance in the field
of cultural property legislation overall. It has already been ratified by the majority of states
worldwide and was a significant new step in cultural property regulation.64 In addition to
being “demonstrated in the preamble to UNESCO 1970 which sets forth cultural property
as one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture and acknowledges that its
true value can only be appreciated in the fullest context possible”65, Merryman emphasizes
parts of the convention like article 4 as proof of its culturally nationalistic tone:
The States Parties to this Convention recognize that for the purpose of the Convention
property which belongs to the following categories forms part of the cultural heritage of
each State:
(a) Cultural property created by the individual or collective genius of nationals of the State
concerned, and cultural property of importance to the State concerned created within the
territory of that State by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident within such territory;
(b) cultural property found within the national territory;
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological or natural science missions,
59 Knox, 2006, p. 323
60 Merryman, 1985, pp. 1912-1913
61 Id. pp. 1914-1916
62 Id., p. 1912
63 Merryman, 1988, pp. 489-495; Sljivic, 1998, pp. 399-400
64 UNESCO: Illicit Traffic
65 Knox, 2006, pp. 323-324
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with the consent of the competent authorities of the country of origin of such property;
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely agreed exchange;
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally with the consent of the
competent authorities of the country of origin of such property.66
According to Merryman, articles like this set a very different tone about the allocation of
cultural property than Hague 1954. In here, the emphasis is on the states – it is up to them
to  define  their  cultural  property  in  any  way as  they  wish,  and  the  convention  sets  out  to
protect the national interest of retention of such property.67 Ana  Sljivic  expands  on  how
UNESCO 1970 works towards the nationalist premise:
Under Article 3, trade is "illicit" if contrary to a state's law. This means that if a source
nation promulgates a law proscribing export of particular items, such export is "illicit"
under the treaty. Thus, what constitutes "illicit" trade is subject to the vagaries of national
rather than objective criteria. Such a "blank check," giving a source nation the power to
define "illicit" subjectively, without participation from market nations, affirms the idea that
UNESCO 1970 is preeminently nationalist legislation.68
Merryman’s thoughts about cultural nationalism and internationalism aren’t, however,
always taken at face value. Those in the discussion (including Merryman) tend to be
somewhat biased towards either side, which results in the fact “that the choice of terms in
which to conduct such a discussion is unfortunately often predisposed toward a particular
view” and Merryman tends to use several fairly value-charged terms.69 Prott also criticizes
Merryman’s claim of the international documents’ support for either side, as much of the
rhetoric in their articles stems from very different legislative goals: UNESCO 1970 has to
be very wide in its definition of cultural property, because the list is exhaustive, and has to
allow different cultures valuing very different types of cultural property, while Hague 1954
is exemplary (and created with a much narrower view of cultural property in mind).70
Merryman is also criticized for having a very Western view of cultural
property. According to Nora Niedzielski-Eichner, “[t]he claim that art transcends national
boundaries makes sense in relation to art created with that goal in mind”, but not all art fits
that mold.71 Missing from his list of what types of things cultural property is comprised of
and whose items they are, “are those groups not comfortable with having their cultural
objects considered as commodities for the market; tribal and indigenous communities and
66 UNESCO 1970, art. 4
67 Merryman 1988, passim
68 Sljivic, 1998, p. 405
69 Prott, 2005, pp. 226-227
70 Id. pp. 227-228
71 Niedzielski-Eichner, 2005, p. 194
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creators of various sorts not regarded within their communities, or regarding themselves, as
artists but bearers of a communal tradition.”72 Merryman’s idea of cultural property is that
of commodities, while many critics emphasize the value of cultural items for (especially
indigenous) communities, items important for the traditions of such people.73 Finally,
regarding the movement of cultural objects advocated by Merryman’s internationalism,
“[m]any objects, particularly those created for religious or political contexts, were never
intended for circulation, because their significance is tied to their place of origin.”74
There are also other criticisms, some of which will be dealt with in later
chapters. Finally, I personally feel that the term ‘nationalism’ in cultural nationalism is
quite value-loaded, and perhaps does not serve the true ideals behind the principle. A term
such as ‘contextualism’ or ‘localism’ might better serve the purpose.
3. Brief History of Cultural Property
This chapter explores the history of cultural property to better understand the concept and
its origins, tracing its roots to the role of art in Antiquity, and the history of plunder. It is a
history of slow and gradual changes in attitudes and ideals that eventually lead to the
emergence of the concept as it is known today. I will trace these changes through the lens
of the history of plunder, as the attitudes towards plunder reflect very closely those towards
cultural property. Looting in war has also had an important role in shaping the ideals of
cultural property from a target of systematic plunder to something inviolably tied to the
people who have created it. This will also, at the same time, explain how and why the
situation where the objects are spread around the globe has come to be, where the idea of
the universal museum has come, and how there can be two such opposite ways to view the
allocation of cultural property as cultural nationalism and internationalism. In some ways,
they can be seen as the views of the plundered and the plunderer.
72 Prott, 2005, p. 228
73 Id. p. 231
74 Niedzielski-Eichner, 2005, p. 194
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3.1. Ancient World and beyond – Near East, Greece, Rome
3.1.1. Near-East and Greece in Antiquity
Art has always been a central part of human nature and culture. And for almost as long, it
has also served many different purposes. While it can be purely a source of beauty and
aesthetics, very often there are also important other functions it represents: might, prestige,
conviction, propaganda. As an important representation of such power, art has often had an
important role also in warfare, and there is historical evidence from thousands of years ago
of art plundered after a victorious campaign. The Near-Eastern people of Akkadia had in
the 23rd century  BCE constructed  a  victory  stele  to  commemorate  their  triumph over  the
Lullabi people, but about a thousand years later, the same stele was plundered by Elamites,
who conquered the once-Akkadian city of Sippar and took it to their own capital, Susa (and
carved  on  the  opposite  side  a  depiction  of  their  own victory  over  the  Akkadians).  At  the
same location it was then excavated in 1898 CE by the French and now stands in the
Louvre Museum in Paris.75
However, the plunder of art is not the only continuous feature represented
here. Soon after the victorious Akkadian leader, Naram-Sin, died, the Akkadian empire
collapsed after a severe drought and a resulting famine. This fall was associated with
Naram-Sin’s looting of the Temple of Enlil, which had brought the wrath of the gods upon
the Akkadians. This perceived sanctity of religious sites, and the moral outrage after their
looting, is a persistent theme in the history of plunder, and is especially strong throughout
Antiquity.76
The Greek historian Xenophon wrote that, in the Middle-East, the tradition
had been that the plundering of the defeated enemy was the rule, the only exception to
which was a humane decision by the general (philanthropy). And this tradition continued
with  the  Greeks  and  Romans  as  well.  Sometimes  the  items  themselves  were  believed  to
have a great impact in the faiths of those involved, such as the protective Palladion statue
of  Troy,  the  loss  of  which  was  said  to  have  caused  both  the  city’s  downfall,  as  well  as,
later, of those who had stolen it due to the sacrilegious nature of the act. This, of course,
resulted in a further importance placed on such items, for both the defender and the
75 Trevor-Roper, 1970, p. 7; Miles, 2008, p. 16.
76 Miles, 2008, pp. 16-18
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attacker, and as both coveted plunder and sacred relics not to incite the wrath of gods. Of
course, not all statues were considered to have supernatural qualities, but this did not mean
such statues could not also have similarly important value. One such example are the
Tyrannicides of Athens, who the Persian king Xerxes had removed to his capital, Susa,
upon his sack of Athens. Representing the uprising that had led to the first democratic
constitution in Athens, these statues had such widely-known symbolic importance for the
Athenians that not only were new replacements immediately commissioned after Xerxes
had been driven out of Greece, but about 150 years later Alexander the Great is said to
have sent the originals back to (the recently conquered) Athens, in a gesture of respect.77
This reveals an idea very reminiscent of cultural property.
Though plunder was an essential part of war, in Greece art wasn’t often a
specific target of plunder, but rather a result of the war. Art was created as a result of
victorious battles and campaigns, in order to thank the gods for the success. Art and
religion were inseparable, as the former was inseparably tied to the latter. Everything in the
temples was considered the property of the gods, and so immune from the plunder of war
(unlike all other property). Especially the Greeks, but also their enemies, respected this rule
quite well – though obviously not without exception, and the respect would also diminish
as time went on, due to, for example, the economics of warfare (but the moral outrage
didn’t diminish even though the rule became violated).78 There was also art  in the cities’
public areas – especially statues were used in this way. Private consumption of art was
practically inexistent, and only slowly began rising from the 5 th century BCE onwards.79
These early manifestations may explain in part the perceived sanctity of
cultural  property  even  today.  For  one,  much  of  the  origins  of  art  (and  as  such,  cultural
property) are in expressions of religion; in other words, cultural property often literally was
sacred. Secondly, already the Tyrannicides show that art has from the beginning come to
act as symbols for their places of origin. In addition, as shown by the victory stele of the
Akkadians, it has been used to symbolically elevate people over others, a show of power.
77 Id., pp. 19-20, 24-26; Greenfield, 2007, pp. 388-390
78 It  is  also  notable  that  although  it  was  always  frowned  upon,  in  the  early  Greek  society  piracy  was  an
acceptable way of life. In fact,  piracy and warfare were quite indistinguishable from each other, as in both
cases a central emphasis was on pillage and plunder. Only with the development of more organized states
(around the shift from the Archaic to the Classical period, circa 500-330 BCE), and so also organized armies,
does  piracy  begin  to  differ  from  warfare  and  begins  to  be  seen  as  more  purely  a  criminal  and  immoral
activity. De Souza, 1999, pp. 17-26
79 Miles, 2008, pp. 30-37; Kivistö & Riikonen, 2009, p. 359
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3.1.2. Ancient Rome
Romans were mainly not themselves producers of art. There would be, however, a growing
interest for art in the empire, which in part resulted in a repeated, massive importation of
works of art from the conquered areas. They did still share many qualities with the Greeks
regarding the plunder after warfare. It was also with the Romans, that “aggressive art
imperialism became institutionalized ... beginning with the looting of cultural property by
Roman forces in the sack of Veii [in 396 B.C.]”80 Plunder  was  an  essential  part  of
warfare,81 and they could quite ruthlessly (and in an organized and systematic way) sack
the cities they conquered, but upon entering temples and sanctuaries they would act  very
respectfully and even ask the statues themselves whether they’d like to come to Rome.82
The Roman expansion especially into Greece brought in a flood of new
resources and works of art into Rome, and sparked a heightened interest for Greek art
amongst Romans. There were two opposite responses to it. On the one hand, many thought
that having such magnificent works of art concentrated on display at Rome would
emphasize the empire’s glory and strength, but, on the other hand, there were also many
who, for example, felt that the desire of such luxuries spoiled the Roman integrity and
strength. Although for the Romans, much like for the Greeks, art was still in general a
public experience, the private collection of art was in greater demand than before. It is
notable, however, that in Rome homes were regarded much more as public spaces than
later, so even there the art would not be purely in the private sphere. One concern about the
appropriation of notable art from the conquered lands was voiced by at least Polybius, as
well as, to some extent, Cicero, upon seeing Greeks in Rome lamenting over statues
plundered from their home town. They were afraid of the antipathy against Rome that such
encounters might bring on the foreigners. Indeed, the writers here quite explicitly
recognize the emotional charge and (nationalistic) value significant works of art have in
their culture of origin.83
The  fears  of  those  such  as  Cicero  did  not  greatly  affect  the  quantity  of
plunder in Rome, but an effect may be seen in that many of the most applauded and
80 Merryman, 2006a, p. 4
81 The importance of art as bounty of war is best is best illustrated by the Triumph, the highest honor granted
by the senate to the most successful generals. In a Triumph, the spoils of war were displayed in a ceremonial
procession through Rome. (Miles, 2008, pp. 55-60)
82 Miles, 2008, pp. 13, 48, 50-53
83 Id., pp. 60-62, 82-90, 185-186; Kivistö & Riikonen, 2009, p. 359
24
respected generals were, in fact, such who showed mercy and restraint upon the usual
pillaging of the conquered cities. Some not only spared people and treasure, but even made
an effort to even return culturally important treasures cities had lost to pillagers. The most
famous such general was Scipio Aemilianus, who, after the destruction of Carthage in 146
BCE, returned “revered and sacred images that had been taken by Carthaginians from
Greeks in Sicily”84,  echoing  the  actions  of  Alexander  the  Great  in  his  restitution  of  the
Tyrannicides (though it is unlikely that Scipio would have had this in mind). Actions like
this were also much applauded by those who feared angering people in cities whose
statuary  and  other  property  the  Romans  took.  In  a  different  type  of  incident  (one  that  is
opposite, but shows the same kinds of ideals), after he had quite ruthlessly pillaged the
Greek city of Ambracia in 189 BCE, general Fulvius Nobilior was ordered by the Senate to
return his plunder to the city (though many statues nevertheless remained in Rome).85
3.1.3. Cicero and the Verrines
In Rome, there was one event which had a great influence on views and arguments about
cultural property all the way to even our times. This was the prosecution of Gaius Verres,
on the charges of extortion of forty million sesterces from the locals while he was acting as
the governor of Sicily, from 73 to 70 BCE (exceptionally for three years, instead of the
usual one, due to the slave rebellions of Spartacus). Although the charges themselves were
not formally about the misappropriation and plunder of local cultural treasures, but rather a
more general charge of misuse of office, Cicero – the prosecutor – spent a great deal of
effort to prove how Verres had not only extorted money but acted in ways even more
heinous and un-Roman, even before his time as governor of Sicily – and here the plunder
of art came into central stage. And though Cicero never got to deliver most of his speeches
in the trial because already after the opening statement Verres decided to go voluntarily
into exile, it did not stop them from becoming widely known and recognized after he had
published them in writing.86
The actions of Verres describe what the Romans’ lust for art could be like in
extremes  and  what  kind  of  a  status  art  had  in  Rome,  but  more  importantly,  the  widely
84 Miles, 2008, p. 96
85 Id., pp. 95-99; Kajava, 2009 p. 129
86 Miles, 2008, pp. 116-117, 125, 129-131. Before the Verrines,  the  publishing  of  speeches  was  not  a
common practice (and in fact it could be said that the Verrines created this literary type). On Cicero’s reasons
for publishing, see Id. pp. 137-143
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spread speeches that Cicero published would set the tone of the rhetoric – and even explicit
arguments – used in cultural property repatriation argumentation for millennia to come.
Even in the late 18th century would the Verrines be used as an important model by Edmund
Burke in the prosecution of Warren Hastings, and the speeches were still widely used as
models of rhetoric and as a common part of Latin education in the 19th century.87 And in
his famous poems against Lord Elgin, Lord Byron drew much inspiration from Verres as
well.88
Cicero wanted to paint a picture of Verres as a ruthless pursuer of own gain
and a greedy hoarder of luxuries. In this he not only looked throughout Verres’ career as an
official, but compared him to examples of past activities of honorable Romans. Throughout
his career, he had managed to create an astonishing track record of criminal activities of
everything from theft and extortion to murder.89 Cicero didn’t condemn even large-scale
plunder and pillage, but that was always only done when it was necessary as a part of war.
In comparing Verres to the honorable generals, Cicero wanted to show both that the
plunder was only acceptable in war against enemies, not during peace with people under
Roman control, as well as that the honorable generals showed modesty, personal restraint
and respect for the defeated people and their culture and property.90 The Verrines in their
own  part  solidified  the  idea  of  every  peoples’  right  to  their  own  cultural  property,  the
culturally nationalistic argument.
3.2. Cultural Property and War in Modernity
3.2.1. 30 Years’ War
In  the  example  set  by  Rome,  following  empires  such  as  Byzantium  would  place  high
emphasis on the symbolic power of public works of art, but soon looting in the scale that it
had been would greatly diminish. The later era of the Middle-Ages brought back plunder in
a larger scale in the Crusades, and we can still see some of their plunder in for example
Venice, who took the four horses of Lysippos from Byzantium in 1204 (and, ironically,
87 Id., pp. 7-8, 302, 305-307
88 St. Clair, 1967, pp. 163
89 See in general Miles, 2008, pp. 105-151. In one extreme case, Cicero even talks about Verres crucifying a
Roman citizen – “a punishment usually reserved for rebellious slaves.” (Id., p. 133)
90 Id., pp. 97-100
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centuries later lost them again to Napoleon, though only for a while).91 But, although the
crusaders could certainly be as aggressive with their plunder as the Romans, in the late
period of the Renaissance a new emphasis was placed on private collections, which meant
a change of direction in the course of plunder, as before the emphasis had been on more
public monuments.
Coming to the 17th century, collections of all kinds – especially art and books
- would come to mean things such as power and personal magnificence for the ruler who
held them (and it was not only the rulers – by the end of the 16th century the greatest
aristocrats could outdo even the princes with their collections); the function of art had
changed drastically since the times of Rome. The monarchs rivaled each other in building
collections more grand than the other, a trend greatly helped by a time of relative peace
(though the extravagances of the princes did cause unrest amongst the common people
who would end up paying for them) and a newly-founded, continent-spanning art market in
its full boom. However, the competition eventually culminated during the 30 Years’ War,
in “the last unredressed violent artistic upheaval in Europe.”92
When hostilities broke out all throughout Europe in the 30 Years’ War, it was
no coincidence, then, that the art collections of the rivaling kingdoms became a prime
target of pillage. There was a great symbolic power in absorbing the collection of an
opponent, and this would happen, or be attempted, numerous times over the course of the
30 Years’ War, beginning with the swallowing of the Protestant Palatine library into the
library of the Vatican – and act quite unlike any before between European nations. But not
all the art would be plundered. The court of Mantua sold in 1627 and the following years
the bulk of their  famous art  collection to keep up with the dukes’ boisterous lifestyle,  an
act which caused a huge outcry amongst the people of the city who had come to consider
the collection a national one, instead of private property of the dukes.93 The Mantuans
heralded a change in attitudes to be followed on a wider scale only in the 19th century.
91 Merryman, 2006a, pp. 5-6; Miles, 2008, p. 275-281; Wilson, 1985, pp.102-103
92 Trevor-Roper, 1970, pp. 7-16
93 Id., pp. 22-36. In a sale that was viewed by contemporaries as scandalous, the collection was bought by
Charles I of England who considered this purchase the most successful moment of his career. He would not
part with the collection even though the Mantuans were willing pay twice the sum to buy it back. As it were,
the works of art were safer off in England, as soon after the sale the 30 Years’ War caught up with the city
and the palace was stripped of all remaining works, never to be found again. After the demise of Charles I in
the English Revolution, the collection would be sold on to agents of other sovereigns.
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The battle over the arts in the 30 Years’ War eventually culminated on the
collection of Rudolf II (1552-1612), Holy Roman Emperor from 1576 to 1612. Though
there were many other collections alike, the very reclusive and eccentric emperor had
managed to assemble the most magnificent collection in all of Europe, by patronizing and
buying works from many of the greatest artists and craftsmen from around the continent. It
was no surprise, then, that after his death, in the 30 Years’ War, his treasures did not
survive for very long in one place. The first threat came already in 1619, but from within:
“the rebellious Bohemian nobility, having deposed of the Hapsburgs (at least on paper),
proposed to convert their treasure into cash in order to finance their revolution”94, but the
sale was interrupted by the battle of the White Mountain. A much greater threat ensued
when the Swedes entered the war in 1630. The Swedes, led by Gustavus Adolphus,
vigorously plundered the cities they conquered, such as Munich in 1632 – at which point
its collection was second only to the Emperor’s. The King died soon after, though, only to
be followed by his daughter, the culturally insatiable Queen Christina, who was intent to
turn the capital city Stockholm into one of the cultural centers of Europe. And for this she
turned  her  eye  on  Prague,  and  the  collection  of  Rudolf  II.  On  the  first  occupation  they
missed the loot because the imperial chamberlain had hid it in time in a safe place. But the
second time, in a hurry before the peace-negotiations already underway would spoil the
opportunity, Prague was captured again and plundered with the clear object of securing the
imperial collections for the Queen.95
The Queen  did  not,  however,  long  hold  on  to  her  vision  of  Stockholm as  a
cultural center. In 1654 she abdicated the crown and left for Rome, taking much of her art
collection with her, buying, selling and even looting (from unsuspecting hosts) more works
on the way. After her death, the collection dispersed even further. The plunder of Rudolf
II’s collection is the last successful campaign of plunder of arts in such a scale, and not to
be equaled perhaps until the Second World War, or at least the Napoleonic wars. Although
later  it  would  be  attempted  by  at  least  Napoleon  and  Hitler,  in  the  long  run  all  those
attempts would be redressed. The Peace of Westphalia also stabilized conditions so that the
warring princes in Europe would no longer pillage each others’ treasures like they had in
the  30  Years’  War  and  before.  Art  also  lost  some of  its  ideological  meaning  and  wasn’t
such an integral part of the prestige of the government – and in fact, as had in some ways
94 Id., p. 17
95 Id., pp. 12-13, 17-18, 38-45. Much of the art did not make it to Stockholm, but was lost on the way (which
wasn’t unusual).
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already been seen in Mantua, it would become more and more seen as something of the
public sphere, national collections, instead of private property of the ruler.96
3.2.2. Napoleon
But the idea of the one center of culture with all the greatest works of art in the world was
not dead for good. At the end of the 18th century, Napoleon had the vision of Paris and the
Louvre as such a place, and had very systematic plans for achieving this goal.97 In his
conquest of Italy, he had already before the invasion devised a precise plan on where, how
and what pieces of art would be looted and brought back to Paris from the conquered
cities. And his success in war made sure that his plans would bear fruit. In a couple of
years Napoleon had stripped most of Italy of all its greatest sculptures and paintings and
sent them to Paris to the Louvre (soon to be named Musée Napoléon). He took a lot from
the Vatican, moving the entire papal archive from Rome. As a further connection between
his empire and that of ancient Rome, when the most important works would arrive in Paris,
Napoleon had them displayed in a procession closely modeled after the Triumphs in
Rome.98
The actions did not go uncriticized, though – certainly not abroad, but even
inside France, there were some who would openly oppose such a violent dislocation of art,
the most recognized of which was artist and architectural theorist Antoine-Chrysostôme
Quatremère de Quincy. In the open letters to General Miranda, he made good use of
Cicero’s Verrines, and contrasted Napoleon’s actions to those of Scipio Aemilianus, famed
for his repatriation of statuary. Although his objections were in part political,99
Quartremère made his case by claiming that art was universal and so not to be possessed,
but rather ought to be held in its original context, for the benefit of all humankind (an idea
originating at least from Polybius, and transmitted to Quartremère through Cicero).100
Quartremère is one of the first to argue in these very modern ideas of cultural property of
all humankind and original context. What is most striking to the contemporary observer is,
96 Id., pp. 47-59; Wilson, 1985, p. 103
97 On the origins of the Louvre, see McClellan, 1994
98 Miles, 2008, pp. 319-324; Gould, 2007, pp. 4-6
99 McClellan, 1994, p. 195
100 Miles, 2008, pp. 326-327
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however, that he in fact combines the internationalist and nationalist arguments into one.101
In fact, originally the two ideals were usually not so separate, as they now appear.102
Of course, Napoleon’s looting was not limited to Italy. His armies would
plunder treasures from wherever they went, for example Germany and the Netherlands.
But the French quest for loot was not only restricted inside Europe, as they amassed a great
mission in North Africa, mainly Egypt, as well. While the military side of the campaign
was quite a fiasco, the artistic side had remarkable results. With the troops Napoleon had
scientists and specialists, doing research, excavations and the like. The result was “a wealth
of knowledge about Egypt, ancient and modern”103 as well as a handsome collection of
excavated artifacts, some brought back to Paris and some – such as the Rosetta Stone – lost
to the British after the military defeat the French suffered in Egypt. The result of the
Egyptian campaign was something far-reaching and unforeseen as it inspired a new wave
of  enthusiasm  towards  Egyptology  –  and  on  the  contrary  to  the  Italian  plunder,  the
Egyptian artifacts were well-received throughout Europe.104
Napoleon’s plunders came to an end at the battle of Waterloo in 1815, when
the Allied forces finally defeated the French. The Commander of the British army, the
Duke of Wellington, made the historic decision to return all the art plundered by the
French to their earlier owners. He also left all works that did belong to the French where
they  were,  even  though there  were  those  who saw it  fit  to  plunder  as  reparations  for  the
losses suffered in war (an argument used by the French before). In fact, the British took
nothing  from  Paris  –  though  the  locals,  who  saw  the  art  as  rightfully  belonging  to  them
now (due to many reasons, amongst them the custom of “to the victor the spoils”, as well
as due to the plunder having been made through quasi-legalistic peace treaties), directed
their resentment towards them. Nevertheless, although many pieces could not be returned
for  a  variety  of  reasons,  a  majority  of  the  artwork  plundered  by  the  French  was  now
101 McClellan, 1994, pp. 194-197. Quartremère and his allies’ campaign did eventually bear some fruit with
the Bourbon Restoration of a great deal of religious material, but his campaign against museums like the
Louvre in general wound up unsuccessful. (Id., pp. 194-204). As has been noted earlier, for Merryman,
Quartremère represents one of the early examples of cultural internationalism, but as can be seen, in reality
his ideas were a blend of both internationalist and nationalist ideas and can be used by either side of the
argument for completely opposite positions. See Prott, 2005, pp. 228-229
102 Gillman, 2010, p. 55
103 Id., 2008, p. 328
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returned in a fairly orderly fashion to their previous owners (including, to Venice, the
aforementioned horses of Lysippos (nowadays more often known as horses of Saint
Mark)). The restitution after Waterloo set a huge precedent for future warfare, and had a
great impact in changing the views regarding plunder towards opposing it.105
In part, Napoleon’s actions were fueled by the great competition of the
colonial powers. All the countries in Europe wanted to show off their might though many
different ways and cultural  property was an important way of doing that.  It  was not only
Napoleon that wanted the great universal museum. In the course of the 19th century, the
colonial powers would import huge amounts of cultural items from all over the world.
Combined with a great thrive in pursuit for scientific knowledge, there was a massive
influx of artifacts and works of art coming in to the Western countries. Some were from
legitimate archaeological sites, some from more-or-less ruthless demonstrations of colonial
power.106 It  is  also  in  this  time  that  some  of  the  most  famous  restitution  cases  were
conceived, for example the Parthenon Sculptures and the Benin Bronzes.
3.2.3. World War II
The last great campaign of plunder of arts was performed by Nazi Germany before and
during the Second World War. By this time, though, there was a clear rule of international
law, developed through custom and finally written down in article 46 of the Hague
Convention on the Laws of War in 1907, as well as the Kellog-Briand pact of 1928, both
of which Germany was a party. Hitler had a very similar idea as Napoleon and Queen
Cristina of Sweden (an idea that can be traced all the way to Rome) – to create a cultural
center of Europe (and the world). Hitler wanted to amass all the greatest art in Europe into
Linz, into what would be the “Führermuseum”. Much of the art also went to the highest
ranking Nazi officials, and especially much of the “degenerate”, un-Aryan art – mainly
modern art and art that had something to do with the Jews – would also be sold on. 107
The way the Nazis performed their looting was extremely systematic,
especially when plundering from the Jews. There were several organizations charged with
the task – though many of them were also overlapping and would result in a competition
and conflict between the different branches. In France there were three:
105 Miles, 2008, pp. 329-336; Mackay Quynn, 2007,  pp. 6-9; Merryman, 2006a, p. 6
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The Kunstschutz, which took its orders from the Wehrmacht; the German embassy in Paris,
which took its orders from the Ministry of Foreign affairs; and the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter
Rosenberg für die Besetzten Gebiete, known as the ERR, which took orders directly from
Nazi  ideologue  and  Party  leader  Alfred  Rosenberg.  In  the  end,  it  was  the  ERR  that
dominated the other two branches, though to complicate matters still further,
Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering ... surreptitiously but effectively controlled the ERR.108
Joseph Goebbels was placed in charge of a mission to repatriate German art from the
conquered lands. There were three types of art to be repatriated: art taken in the
Napoleonic Wars; art of German origin; and art of “Germanic character”. In aiding this, the
heads of the party sent an order to art  historian Otto Kümmel,  “to compile an exhaustive
list of German art held in foreign countries since the beginning of the sixteenth century.”109
Aided by this three-volume list consisting of even the smallest pieces of art, and which did
not care about how the art had been transferred away from Germany, the Germans
demanded art returns from all over Europe and beyond, including the United States and the
Soviet  Union.  And of  course  in  all  the  conquered  countries  any  objects  on  the  list  could
simply be taken, though the Nazis did also at times appear to follow quasi-legal
formalities. And it wasn’t always utterly baseless, as in the case of France there was still a
great deal of art that had been just as wrongfully plundered by Napoleon.110
But the worst of the Nazis was to be received by the Jews wherever the Nazis
had control, and they would be stripped of all the valuable possessions they had (wherever
the Nazis invaded, it  was always first  the Jews who were the target of plunder,  then any
other property deemed to be seized to Germany).111 The Germans were also very aware
that many of the leading art dealers in Europe were Jews, and so there was a double
incentive for them to track down every Jewish collector and their often-impressive
collections  (which  the  owners,  of  course,  did  often  do  their  best  to  hide  –  as  well  as
transfer abroad). Especially in France, there were, for a country at war, almost incredible
resources  spent  on  the  tracking  down  and  transferring  away  of  the  art  collections  of  the
Jews.112
According to an estimate made by the Allies in 1949, over the course of the
Second World War the Nazis stole just under 250,000 paintings alone. And if one counts
all  the  different  types  of  cultural  property,  the  amount  of  stolen  object  is  well  in  the
108 Feliciano, 1997, pp. 4-5
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millions.113 However, it was not only the Nazis who would plunder in the war, as also the
Soviet Union would make its own campaign of systematic looting of the conquered
German territories (partially motivated by retribution,114 partially by other reasons, like
their own desire to create a museum like the one Hitler had planned in Linz115). In a short
while, after conquering the formerly German-occupied territories, the Soviet Union had
extracted hundreds of thousands of pieces of cultural property from Germany, whether it
was Russian or German of origin or having been taken by the Nazis from any other of the
Allied countries.116 However, even with the massive counter-plundering campaign
performed by the Soviet Union, the amount of art looted by them would still not compare
to the amount plundered by the Nazis.
There were already during the war plans being made within the Allies of
restitution of art looted by the Germans. Once Germany had been defeated, however,
almost all attempts at coming to a functioning solution between the winning states failed.
All the countries had their own interests they were trying to push forward, and all the while
the Soviet Union was hiding all information from its territory as well as continuing (also in
secret) its own looting campaign.117 There were several important collections that were
thought lost or destroyed during the war that were only in the 1990’s discovered to have
been taken and hidden by the Soviets.118 The restitution campaign was erratic at best,
certainly not helped by the upheaval of almost all of Europe and its cultural property as a
result of the war,119 and hindered even further by the Soviet Union’s actions, but it did
plant an important seed that did perhaps in later decades grow into a more effective
campaign  towards  a  more  comprehensive  restitution.  Of  course,  at  that  point  a  lot  of  the
artwork, information and rightful owners had gone missing.
Regarding cultural property, the Allies did, however, manage at least one
notable result at the end of the war: in the Nuremberg trials, for the first time in history the
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plundering of cultural property was made into a war crime when many of the Nazi officials
were charged and sentenced with charges relating to (among other things) the looting.120
The results of the plunder of art during the Second World War are still visible
today. The massive upheaval of art caused numerous priceless collections to be scattered
around the world, into both public and private hands. Many who bought or got a hold of
such pieces did know their history (or knowing the risk did not wish to inquire too deeply
into the provenance)121, but many also didn’t, and the more hands such a piece has been
passed to, the more unlikely it is that there is any knowledge of the original illegality of the
acquisition. This has caused lots of strife between owners in good faith and original owners
(or their heirs) hoping for restitution. And because of the nature of the art market, it is easy
for  potential  buyers  and  sellers  to  hide  details  of  the  exchange,  the  parties  and  the
provenance of a piece from the larger public, so that in a case where a painting which
could be claimed by the original owner,  those involved can either pull  the piece from an
auction, or hide it so that it cannot be traced.122 It has also been said that at least most
museums hold stolen art in their collections.123 And there are still, on a fairly regular basis,
cases  of  art  stolen  by  the  Nazis  found  and  even  confiscated  from  private  owners.  Most
recently, in the beginning of November 2013, news spread of a German man whose father
had been an art collector in the 1930’s and 1940’s, with a collection of art many of which
were most likely taken from the Jewish by the Nazi, with an estimated value of up to even
a billion dollars.124
The experiences of World War II also greatly affected the birth of
international (as well as national) legislation on cultural property. The fact that “[c]ultural
property instruments arose out of experiences of conflict”125 and  that  “[t]he  struggle  to
define ‘cultural property’ and to determine appropriate protection for it in the twentieth
century has arisen from, and is entwined with, looting and theft of (primarily art) objects
during war”126 have strongly affected what kind of route the (international) legislation has
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taken. There has always been a strong emphasis on the preservation of the objects, as
shown by the very first treaty on the matter, the 1954 Hague convention. The UNESCO
1970  convention  also  emphasizes  this  point,  as  well  as  the  role  of  the  nations  and  their
right to their own cultural property (in other words, emphasizing their sovereignty, echoing
the violations of sovereignty in the two World Wars). The international legislation in the
20th century in many ways finalized the development that properly began after the battle of
Waterloo. We are also now seeing the risk of going too far, the fear of losing something we
do not perhaps now see as valuable is leading a very high chance of over-flooding the
cultural property field so that too much is protected and we lose sight of what really is
valuable and what is not. Everything cannot be preserved and some things need to be let go
if we wish to preserve cultural property as something meaningful in our lives.
4. What’s Yours is Mine – Cultural Property Argumentation
In  this  chapter  I  explore  the  argumentation  in  the  demands  for  the  restitution  of  cultural
property. The aim is, on the one hand, to act as an introduction into the debate: to present
its foundations and such arguments that are used throughout the discourse. On the other
hand, the aim is to find out how different arguments are used throughout the discussion, in
order to find out if there are structures and patterns in the use of the argumentation and the
rhetoric which can then be used to explain some of the indefinite nature of the debate.
There are certain themes and types of argument that tend to repeat themselves
in different cultural property restitution cases. For example Paul Bator127 (though speaking
in  more  general  terms)  and  Lyndel  V.  Prott  and  P.J.  O’Keefe128 have gathered and
compiled  a great deal of the different arguments used in the debate. In Bator’s approach,
there are different values which, in effect, can be translated into actual arguments, and
from his values other writers have developed this categorization even further.129 Prott and
O’Keefe have compiled six main arguments for restitution and five for retention. In
addition, they list several background factors which also have an effect in the
127 Bator, 1982
128 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989
129 Urice, 2006, p. 145. In regards to the work by Bator, Patty Gerstenblith has critiqued his approach, saying
that while Bator does acknowledge “the losses caused by plunder of sites and monuments, his failure to treat
differently the category of archaeological materials looted directly from the ground and to incorporate that
distinction consistently into his legal analysis produces an unfortunate but significant flaw in this landmark
work.” (Gerstenblith, 2001, p. 198, footnote 2) In regards to the cases studied here, however, this omission
does not have great significance.
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argumentation.130 I will use these lists as basis for the comparison of the argumentation in
the different restitution cases, though will omit some less important points, or such less
suitable to those in this study.
4.1. Home culture
Almost all of these arguments are present in the most famous and one of the oldest of the
still debated cultural property restitution cases, the Parthenon Sculptures.131 Often referred
to as the cause célèbre of restitution cases, it has been a matter of contestation ever since
its beginnings in the turn of the 19th century. The marble sculptures were removed from the
Parthenon in Athens and shipped off to Britain, where they were eventually sold to the
government and located in the British Museum where they still are.132
The foundation of the Parthenon case, as well as all other cultural property
restitution cases, is the basic notion of the cultural nationalism approach, as here defined
by John Henry Merryman:
[T]he Marbles belong in Greece because they are Greek. They were created in Greece by
Greek artists for the civic and religious purposes of the Athens of that time. ... [B]eing in
this sense Greek, they belong among Greeks, in the place (the Acropolis of Athens) for
which they were made.133
As noted above, this argument is in the core of all cases for cultural property restitution –
and in that sense is not even an argument per se,  but rather a basic assessment,  based on
which the further arguments are made. For example, Prott and O’Keefe do not list it as a
separate argument but rather under this idea are smaller arguments which in total constitute
this assessment.
While in most of the cases there is no uncertainty regarding this argument –
the Parthenon Sculptures are Greek and, were they to be returned, they would go to Greece
(and Athens, in particular); the Nefertiti Bust would go to Egypt, and so forth – there are
some where claims have been made, but it is uncertain what really would be the “rightful”
130 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, pp. 838-855
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place of restitution, should a restitution be decided upon. One such interesting case is that
of Hebrew Manuscripts, which is an unusual one in many ways. Instead of being about a
single object or objects from a single time and place, or even from a single source, it is a
more general case for return of objects taken in many different points in history, in many
different places – religious and other manuscripts taken from the Jews during the long
history of oppression against the Jewish populations in Europe. Although texts of Jewish
origin can be found in many places, and such texts have ended in those places in many
ways, a great deal of the demands do focus on the collection of the Vatican where a large
deal of the collections have wound up sooner or later, often with an unknown provenance
(many of which have been taken by force at some point in history). The reasons why the
manuscripts are demanded to be returned are in essence twofold: the religious and cultural
importance of the texts to the Jewish people, and the morally wrongful way in which many
of these manuscripts were taken (an argument which will be discussed later).134
To leave all other elements aside and simply focus on where the Hebrew
Manuscripts would belong were such a restitution to be made, there is a clear problem with
this case. Unlike in the average restitution case, the Hebrew manuscripts do not have an
obvious “home” where they would belong. The Jewish people, although in many ways
culturally their separate group (in other words, it could be argued, not just sharing a
religion but being of a kind of Jewish “nationality”), have been dispersed here and there
amongst the different populations of Europe and the objects in question have been taken in
many times and in many places, from indeterminable people. The main source of demands
for restitution is the state of Israel which does claim to speak for all the Jewish people, but
it’s somewhat questionable whether the state can really claim to represent all the Jewish
people who still are scattered around the world in many different cultures – and have been
a very long time in history.135
And yet another matter are more recent cases. During the Second World War
the Nazis plundered from the Jewish people and countries with large Jewish populations all
over Europe. The Israeli ambassador in Prague has claimed the return of items taken by
Nazis from Jews in Czechoslovakia and other European states and brought to the “Museum
of a lost race”, and later after the wars passed to the Czech state. In 2004 the Czech
Republic returned to Poland the Saraval collection of Hebrew manuscripts that had been
134 Greenfield, 2007, pp. 206-221
135 Id., p. 213
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stolen by the Nazis from Wroclaw in Poland in 1938.136 These different situations reflect a
fundamental question in the debate and its inherent conflicts: who has the right to represent
a culture? In a less crucial manner, it also deals with the way cultural nationalism is
defined: is it a matter of culture or a matter of (nationalist) state? On the one hand, in the
case of the Hebrew manuscripts that have been taken in the course of history, the objects
have been taken from separate communities – that do share a culture but are still also
scattered around (but often kept separate from137) the different cultures around the
continent – but are now claimed by a single state created centuries later in very different
circumstances. On the other hand, the post-World War restitutions have often targeted the
locations where the specific communities were, like Poland. But if Israel is accepted to
represent the Jewish people (and since it can even be seen as redress for the treatment of
Jewish people in the Second World War), being even called “the Jewish State” in the
original General Assembly resolution,138 should the cultural objects be given there, as the
state itself demands?
Many of those who survived the war did also leave for Israel, and nowadays
the  state  is  home  to  approximately  half  the  Jewish  people  in  the  world.  However,  the
general rule is that “the country of origin of a certain item of cultural property is also the
country of the people whose cultural heritage that item represents.”139 But the Jews might
just be a special case, both a part of and apart from the many different (European) nations
on whose territory they have been located in. The state of Israel may be the Jewish state,
but some of the communities that have been the victim of the many persecutions against
the  Jewish  people  do  also  still  exist  and  are  making  demands.  There  is  also  not  just  one
single Jewish culture in Israel, but rather the state is rather clearly cut into different Jewish
ethnicities, in quite separated societal and cultural niches.140 And, as we have seen, some
countries now do indeed cherish their Jewish heritage, as well. However, one Israeli writer
finds this newfound respect for the cultural heritage of the long-spurned Jewish people as
“ironic”, and rather states that “[j]ustice, fairness and common sense alike” dictate that
“once the principle of the right of the Jewish people to own the cultural property
representing their cultural heritage is accepted, the disposition of this property and the
modalities concerning its distribution will become a matte to be settled between the State
136 Id., pp.220-221
137 Blum, 2000, p. 92
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of  Israel,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  organizations  representing  the  [major  Jewish
communities of the Diaspora], on the other hand.”141 But this is a matter far from resolved,
and one that is of the essence in all cultural property debate.
A comparable case is that of the Zeus Altar of Pergamon in Berlin.142 It was
created in the 2nd century BCE in what was then a Hellenistic culture, in an area is now a
part of Turkey, then part of the Ottoman Empire. It is Turkey that has led a campaign for
restitution (though started by the local mayor, who feels that the altar is most of all a
representation of the city, not Turkey), but there are clearly also connections with Greece,
who are more generally seen as the descendants of the Hellenic cultures.143
In a case related to both Israel and Turkey, several writers have also brought
forth issues in the situation in relation to the division, disappearance and founding of
nations, as well as cultural minorities inside such nation states:
It is also true that the question of return can be very complicated because of the creation of
new nation states. For example, the question might arise whether Iran could validly claim
Kurdish material. There are many situations in which minority, ethnic or religious groups
are seeking autonomy within a state and where an object could be a focal point of this
ambition, such as, for instance, the Sikh throne of Amritsar.144
A similar  problem would  rise  for  nomadic  tribes  or  such  tribes  in  Africa  that  have  been
split between different states artificially in the division of the continent by the colonial
powers. All in all, the problems here show that the idea of a home culture is far from clear,
and in many cases it will require the settling of many deeper issues before any
considerations for the actual restitution can even be made.
4.1.1. Home culture subcategories
As stated above, the “home culture” argument or assessment can be seen to have several
subcategories which, in my opinion, act as the actual arguments in the debate. In the
categories set by Prott and O’Keefe, these are the need for cultural identity, the
appreciation in its own environment and the need for national identity.145 In the value-
141 Id., pp. 90-94
142 The altar was brought in the late 19th century from the Hellenistic city of Pergamon, in the area of
modern-day Turkey, to the Prussian Empire, and is now reconstructed (though not necessarily authentically)
in Pergamon Museum in Berlin. (Bilsel, 2000, pp. 1-4)
143 Bilsel, 2000, pp. 4-15
144 Greenfield, 2007, p. 410
145 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, pp. 839-843
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based approach based on the work by Bator there are two values to be seen to fit inside the
main argument, the ‘inalienable national identity value’ and the ‘essential propinquity’.146
Many of these arguments deal with the significance of cultural objects to the
cultural identity of a people. The arguments of the need for cultural identity and national
identity, the inalienable national identity value and the essential propinquity are all similar
ideas, though all with some important differences in detail. The main difference between
the cultural and national identity arguments is the manner in which they are utilized. The
national identity argument is more a political argument than the cultural one, focusing on
the building of a unified state. It is especially useful in post-colonial situations:
For the national administrations, building a national identity is an important part of their
administrative task if the country is to survive as a unit, which is very often an economic
imperative. Promoting understanding between regional cultures and fostering national pride
in the variety of the State’s cultural achievement is one way of forwarding the necessary
political commitment to a state whose historical roots are fragile.147
The national identity argument also raises questions about state succession, and highlights
the importance of cultural property to the unity of states: for example the throne of
Menelik II was removed from Ethiopia by Italy precisely for the reason of destroying the
national identity (it has since been returned).148
The cultural identity argument is more about a specific community, and more
about morals than the more secular national argument. A culture, in order to survive and
progress, needs access to its past, and cultural property provides one such access. When a
culture is deprived of objects from its past, it can create “a cultural void which cannot be
filled.”149 Cultures need their roots for not only a feeling of unity and community, but also
for inspiration for people like craftsmen and artists.150 There is a quality in cultural
property that cannot quite be explained simply through the ordinary (or Western) ways of
viewing the world. One way of describing this quality is through the term “mana”. This is
an old concept: “[i]n earlier times conquerors took the cultural property of the losers, in the
146 Urice, 2006, pp. 152-154
147 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 842
148 Id., pp. 842-843
149 Id., p. 840
150 Id., p. 840
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belief that the mana, or cultural identity and strength of the conquered, was embodied in
those objects.”151
Often colonial states have had their cultural traditions denigrated and an
attempt made to assimilate all in the country into the one official mainstream culture.
Many cultural objects have been neglected, destroyed or taken away to Western museums.
There are many cultures, both national and smaller in scale, that have found that they “are
now almost entirely devoid of their cultural heritage.”152 The Oceania region has many
such examples, but they can be found in many other places, as well, although the argument
of being deprived of cultural property is also used by culturally rich nations such as Greece
and Italy (which have seen massive amounts of cultural property exportation in their
history, but also have much more to spare from).153 With the (fairly recent)
acknowledgement of the importance of cultural diversity, the cultural impoverishment of
especially many aboriginal cultures is now seen as a serious issue, and several countries
such as Australia have very positive attitudes in regards to restitution to such peoples.154
These arguments do not go uncriticized, though. Firstly, since culture is not,
in fact, tied to cultural property, it can be questioned whether there is a need for the
material for a culture to continue. After all, you cannot take away the immaterial
expressions of a culture.155 However, without any physical expression of culture, it is too
easy to assimilate and identify to the mainstream culture which is then much more visibly
present and forget about one’s culture of origin. And as has been seen, there is some kind
of inherent “mana” in cultural objects, which does contribute to the overall manifestation
of culture.
Secondly, and related to the previous counterargument, it can be questioned
how much cultural property cultures (nations) really need. A blanket request for any
cultural objects of the home culture (quite rare in reality, though not unheard of) is quite
excessive when arguing for not having enough cultural property to maintain the culture in
question. Surely not everything is required. The argument is in a more common form when
talking about countries that are already rich in cultural property – Greece and Italy are
151 Merryman, 1985, p. 1914
152 Gerstenblith, 2001, p. 206. According to her, this is ”because of 19th century colonialism and the 20th
century [art] market”.
153 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, pp. 839-843
154 Greenfield, 2007, p. 423
155 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 841
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common examples. Even though they have had a vast amount of objects removed, these
states still have so many cultural objects that a large majority of them cannot even be
displayed but are locked in warehouses.156 This is indeed a valid point, especially when
speaking about ordinary archaeological objects and other “everyday” cultural property.
However, in many cases there is also another value to be considered, the inalienable
national identity value.
In many ways, the inalienable national identity value is simply a different
formulation of the national (or cultural) identity argument. But there are certain
differences. While sometimes in extreme cases some are “advocating the return of all
cultural property to its place of origin, no matter what the particular circumstances,”157 in
more balanced claims there are certain differences in nuance in comparison to the cultural
identity argument:
Balanced approaches to the very real connection between cultural property and national
identity recognize that certain objects have a “symbolic nature” and “high emotion
attached” to them. These symbolic and emotional connections can lead to a justification for
return.158
In other words, although a state or culture may have plentiful cultural property in general,
there may be certain objects that have simply such an important value on their own, that it
could be seen as a moral obligation to return them to their culture of origin. Of course, this
requirement can also be used on the other side of the debate, and often is, to argue that a
certain object does not have such value, and so need not be returned.159
Sometimes, especially in the case of Egyptian artifacts, it is also argued that
the objects have such an importance precisely because they were removed. The removal of
antiquities from Egypt and their ensued displaying in the museums brought a boom of
Egyptology in Western countries – but also in Egypt where earlier the ancient history had
been widely ignored.160 The newly spread interest in Egyptology also brought a whole new
value to these artifacts.161 Also, iconic individual works like the Parthenon Sculptures and
156 Merryman, 2006b, p. 110; King, 2006, pp. 304-305
157 Urice, 2006, p. 152
158 Id., pp. 152-153
159 Id., pp. 152-153
160 Cuno, 2008, p. 10
161 Miles, 2008, pp. 328-329
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the Nefertiti Bust are so iconic because they’ve become known and adored in their Western
museums.162
A third critique in the home culture debate deals with the continuity of
cultures.  Many  writers  who  are  skeptic  about  restitution  question  whether  many  of  the
items to be returned can actually be considered a creation of the culture demanding the
restitution. After all, many of the cultural objects are hundreds, even thousands of years old
and created in very different circumstances.163 In the most extreme examples, some writers
have come to insinuate that, for example, the Greeks today have too much mixed races to
actually be “true Greeks”.164 But on somewhat more reasonable arguments, some have
questioned the fact that on, for example, religious grounds, the modern Greeks and
Egyptians have simply too little in common with their ancient counterparts.165 But  in  a
sense, if one can only see the same culture as something that has not in any major ways
changed over time, then one is hard-pressed to find any culture to be continued from the
past.166 All cultures are always in a state of flux, and if a culture needs to be static in order
to be accepted the same culture in the future, then one must in many ways discard the idea
of cultural continuity altogether. In such a way of thinking, culture is something only in the
present (and void of any past or future), and cannot carry on to any future generations. But
that is a difficult view to take, and for example in anthropology cultures are nowadays seen
“as open-ended, contingent, and emergent – processes in history rather than transhistorical
products having more or less coherent identities.”167 Of course, this does not necessarily
mean that, for example, the modern Greeks are the same as the ancient Greeks, but it is
difficult to deny that there is at least some connection.168
In relation to the continuity of cultures, there is the value presented by John
Henry Merryman, called by him ‘essential propinquity’. This is generally an argument for
retention, though in the right circumstances makes a strong case for restitution.169
162 King, 2006, p. 299, 305
163 Id., pp. 308-309; Urice, 2006, p. 153
164 Reppas, 1999, p. 930
165 For example on the Egyptians, see Urice, 2006, p. 153. Regarding the Greeks, this has, however, been
countered by, for example comparisons between language and artistic and scientific traditions, as well as the
perceived connection to the same “Greekness”. See for example Hitchens, 2008a, pp. 101-104. See also
Appiah, 2009, p. 74
166 Hart, 1997, p. 157
167 Handler, 1997, p. 3
168 On arguments supporting the continuity of ancient and modern Greeks, see Greenfield, 2007, pp. 66-67
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169 Urice, 2006, p. 153
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According to Merryman, there are certain cases where the cultural property in question has
such an important meaning to a specific culture, that there is an imperative to return it
despite any competing reasons for retention. There are two criteria for determining such
propinquity: that “the culture that gave the object its cultural significance must be alive”
and that “the object must be actively employed for the religious or ceremonial or
communal purposes for which it was made.”170 However, if these criteria are not met, such
a necessity for restitution is not there, and it is very hard to claim the return of such objects.
Merryman’s argument (from his internationalist perspective) is that usually there is no
additional value to be gained from the cultural property being returned to its place of
origin, and so such an action is without basis.
The relics of earlier cultures in Egypt, Greece, China, and Mexico have no contemporary
religious, ceremonial, or communal function. People who live in those nations today may
place a high value on relics for other reasons, but the use for which they were created is not
among them. The specific cultural value of the relics - for example, as testimony of the way
of  life  of  a  vanished  people,  as  great  works  of  the  art  of  a  specific  time  and  place  -  is
independent of propinquity.171
4.2. Context
One argument for the restitution of cultural property, still somewhat related to the home
culture argument, is that the objects are better appreciated in their original context. This
argument is best applied to large pieces of art that have preferably been meant for the
outdoors, such as the Parthenon Sculptures. The opposing side usually refers to the
comparative context brought by such universal museums as the British Museum. Speaking
about the Parthenon Sculptures, Dorothy King sums up the different sides:
Some xenophobic Britons claim that the Elgin Marbles can only be appreciated in Britain
which is perhaps as extreme as the claim that they can only be appreciated in Greece. The
British Museum’s Trustees and Director argue with more sophistication that the Elgin
Marbles are better seen in the context of other civilizations and cultures, such as the
Egyptians, Syrians and Chinese, in the Museum. The Greeks think that the Elgin Marbles
are better seen in context in Athens, within the framework of the city that once created the
Parthenon.172
Neither side can completely dismiss the other one’s argument as being
baseless. Certainly there is something to be gained from comparison, just as there is
170 Merryman, 1988, p. 497. See also King, 2006, pp. 307-308
171 Merryman, 1988, pp. 497-498
172 King, 2006, pp. 298-299
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something to be gained from the physical connection to the object’s origins – or perhaps
rather something lost without such a connection. King, however, does not agree that any
understanding is lost if the Parthenon Sculptures are not in their original place in Athens.
On  the  one  hand,  “[s]ince  we  are  no  longer  pagans  who  worship  the  Olympian  gods,
neither we British nor the Greeks could ever fully understand the Parthenon and interact
with it in the way originally intended”, and on the other hand, “[m]odern Athens ... is not
the context in which the Parthenon was produced; the city shares the coincidence of the
same geography, but neither the same culture, nor the same religion.”173
On why the universal museum is a better context, King argues: “[m]useums
are often a better place to study art because there, under one roof, are works from many
countries and many periods, and one is able to compare and contrast them.”174 However,
even she herself states that, even though a universal museum is apparently preferred, it is
certainly not the only possible venue for appreciating such pieces, and that they indeed do
have value wherever they might be displayed.175 One critique is voiced by William St
Clair:
But, in any case, the idea that a museum in a northern country is the best context in which
to  appreciate  an  ancient  monument  such  as  the  Parthenon  is  absurd.  As  a  friend  of  mine
from Eastern Europe said when she heard this line being offered on television by the
previous British Museum director. Is he saying I cannot appreciate the Alhambra by going
to Spain to look at it because there are no Greek temples nearby? Is he suggesting that parts
of the Alhambra should be broken off and sent to museums which have strong collections
of Chinese art?176
But a different counterargument comes from critique of the idea of the universal museum.
For one, they have been accused of being a form of idolization of the imperialistic past of,
for example, Great Britain,177 but another critique is that the so-called universal museum of
today, which claims to adhere to the ideal set already in the Enlightenment, does not
actually follow those principles.
The world's art, so the argument ran, should no longer be the private preserve of
aristocracies. The general public too should be given some experience of the greatest
173 Id., pp. 308-309
174 Id., p. 312
175 Id., pp. 312-313
176 St Clair, 2006, pp. 94-95
177 Id., p. 302. On the other hand, King argues, ”the Greeks themselves have turned the Parthenon into a
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Clair, 2006, pp. 66-68
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artistic achievements of the ancient and modern worlds, the originals of which were mostly
in private palaces or in galleries in faraway countries. This genuine attempt to widen access
was done, in the case of sculptures, by plaster casts; in the case of paintings, by having
professional artists make excellent copies, engravings, and later photographs.178
The current museums, however, break from these ideals in several important points. First
of all, they are “only interested in showing original pieces.”179 In addition, it is noted that
even if all the collections were put together, the sample that they provided would still be
small and unrepresentative of the actual variety of the cultures in the world, and the sample
would be that of masterpieces of such cultures that were attracting to collectors and
treasure hunters, instead of the mundane, but perhaps more representative portrayals of
them, or cultures that the collectors were not interested in.180 Finally, for example Jeannette
Greenfield has stated that calling the British Museum “an international cultural institution
... is to perhaps confuse the nature of an institution with the nature of its collection.”181 To
her, “[t]he British Museum is undeniably a national museum.”182
4.3. “New home culture”
An argument often expressed in cultural property cases of high interest is that the presence
of the object in the country where it has been relocated has also made the object the
cultural property of that state, just like of the country of origin. Prott and O’Keefe call this
the “Place in cultural history” argument.183 The argument has been especially used in the
Parthenon Sculptures case, where, for example, John Henry Merryman states that “[t]he
Elgin Marbles and other works in the British Museum have entered British culture, help
define the British to themselves, inspire British arts, give Britons identity and community,
civilize and enrich British life, and stimulate British scholarship.”184 Especially the impact
of  the  Marbles  on  the  British  arts  (especially  both  visual  arts  and  literature)  is  often
emphasized, as they have been the inspiration for many of the most notable artists in
Britain.185 For example Michael J. Reppas II has, however, countered these arguments by
saying that the approximately 200 years that the marbles have been in Britain cannot
178 St Clair, 2006, p. 94
179 Id., p. 94
180 Id., pp. 94-95; Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 850
181 Greenfield, 2007, p. 63
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possibly compare to the 2,500 years of history they have had with the Greeks.186 He goes
on by saying that “[a]lthough the influence of the Marbles on British art and scholarship
should not be disregarded or belittled by any means, it seems quite plausible that their
continued retention in England may serve more as a trophy from their colonial past, than as
an integral part of their contemporary culture.”187 Prott and O’Keefe also state that “[w]hile
such complexities may justify sharing, they can hardly justify exclusion and other factors
may need to be addressed where exchanges and loans cannot solve the conflict.”188
4.4. Wrongful taking
One of the most important arguments in favor of return is ‘wrongful taking’ or ‘correcting
historical wrongs’ argument. The essence of this argument is that in cases where the object
at  hand has been acquired wrongfully,  restitution should be seen as a way to correct this
wrong.189 For  Urice,  obvious  cases  of  wrongful  acquisition  are  cases  like  theft,  while
“[w]orks acquired during periods of colonial occupation, wartime, or periods of civil
unrest, for example, demand special scrutiny.”190 But according to Prott and O’Keefe,
“[t]his argument states that the taking of property (cultural and other) in colonial times was
unlawful in international law and that the property should therefore be returned to the
communities from which it had been illicitly appropriated.”191 However, often there were
non-peaceful means by which the objects were removed that make the acquisition
wrongful, and though there are many who support restoration simply on the basis of the
removal of such objects by a colonial, more commonly there is an abuse of the colonialism
involved that invokes this argument for the writer.192
In fact, a great deal of the cultural property cases that arise are from
situations involving imperialism or colonialism, or a country under foreign occupation.
One such notable case – perhaps the most important restitution case from Africa – is the
case of the Benin Bronzes. In 1897 the British launched a punitive expedition against the
king (the Oba) of Benin, whose men (though apparently unknown by the king) had killed
most  in  a  group  from  the  British  Trading  Post,  who  had  been  sent  “with  the  purpose  of
186 Reppas, 1999, pp. 931-932
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reprimanding him for failure to keep a trading agreement”, even though the Oba had asked
them to “refrain from coming at the moment because of a sacred ceremony”.193 1500 men
were sent to take the capital, found it abandoned and proceeded to pillage the city, taking a
great deal of the vast quantity of items found there. Notable were the hundreds of bronze
items of  very  high  quality,  many of  which  were  later  sold  all  over  the  world  in  order  to
cover the costs of the expedition.194
Although the city of Benin was not strictly under colonial rule at the time,195
overall it is a fairly straightforward case of (excessive) use of colonial power. Still, a vast
majority of the Bronzes are in Western museums like the British Museum and the Berlin
Museum and few – though some – restitutions have been made, so there is far from a
consensus that the wrongness of the situation is so powerful as to necessitate restitution.
Similar arguments have been made in the Parthenon Sculptures case, as well as the case of
the Nefertiti Bust. In neither of these cases, though, was there any violence involved. But
both of them were conducted in imperialistic circumstances, and there have been
accusations of abuse of power.196
In the case of the Parthenon Sculptures, there is in fact a twofold imperialistic
claim. On the one hand, the Greeks, who are considered the culture that created the
sculptures (and so to whom they would belong), were under Ottoman rule. Therefore, they
themselves did not have control over their own cultural property and had no say against the
removal  of  the  marbles.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sculptures  were  removed  by  the  British
ambassador,  at  a  time  when  Britain’s  power  was  at  its  highest  and  when  the  Ottomans
viewed the French as a threat against which they needed an alliance with the British – who
then had additional leverage with the Ottomans, in addition to their already powerful
global position.197 Lord Elgin has been accused of gross misuse of his office and stature.
Most of this is based on the official letter, the firman198, issued by the Ottoman authorities,
that  –  at  least  in  the  remaining  (also  official)  Italian  translation  –  left  it  fairly  open  what
193 Greenfield, 2007, p. 12
194 Id., pp. 122-129. ”Described in an Illustrated London News account of that year as being ‘grotesque’,
these bronzes were later hailed as great works of art.” (p. 123); Chamberlin, 1983, pp. 201-203
195 Chamberlin, 1983, p. 194
196 In general, see Greenfield, 2007, pp. 41-96, on the Parthenon Sculptures; and Siehr, 2006, pp. 114-134, on
the Nefertiti Bust.
197 Gazi, 1990b, p. 244; Reppas, 1999, pp. 922-923. For a comprehensive look into the background factors in
the case, see for example St Clair, 1967.
198 For the original Italian version of the letter, see British Museum: Firman for Elgin; for an English
translation, see British Museum: Firman translation.
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Elgin was actually allowed to do. Nevertheless, by most accounts (at least all accounts
favoring restitution, and it is difficult to convincingly argue otherwise), the wording used
in the firman, to erect scaffolding, reproduce the sculptures in drawings and plaster casts,
and take “some [or ‘any’...] pieces of stone with inscriptions and figures”199, meant that
they were allowed to take with them any pieces of marbles they found in the ground while
excavating, not remove anything from the buildings themselves. However, through a chain
of incidents and coincidences, and apparently “more by chance and opportunity than
design”200 (though, according to some, “through a succession of bribes and threats”201),
Elgin ended up removing over half of the remaining sculptures from the structure of the
Parthenon itself and shipping them to Britain.202 What is, however, used as a
counterargument, is the fact that the Ottoman authorities (who were the legal authority in
Athens  at  the  time,  even  though  some  may  argue  it  wasn’t  for  them  to  decide  on  the
Parthenon) almost never opposed to the actions, and even if they did, eventually allowed it
to continue. This amounts to the doctrine of tacit agreement, whereby the actions that Elgin
did, although going beyond his original authorizations, were silently agreed upon.203 To
this, some have countered with an incident where the Ottoman authorities did prevent
Elgin’s ship from leaving.204 In addition, St Clair points out:
The military governor received payments in the first year alone equivalent to thirty-five
times his annual salary. The governor was given more, and even larger amounts that do not
appear in the accounts were paid to officials in Constantinople. ... The paradigm point is
this. No administrative or judicial system can be expected to withstand such a weight of
political influence and money. This is imperialism in action, destroying not only
monuments but the local administrative and legal infrastructure.205
The case  of  the  Nefertiti  Bust  relies  most  of  all  on  the  concept  of partage.
This was a system “by which a foreign archaeological team and the source nation would
equally divide any objects found during excavations.”206 Although  at  the  time  it  was  a
fairly common arrangement, the partage in  the  case  of  the  Nefertiti  Bust,  as  well  as
sometimes even in general, has been questioned as exploiting of the country where the
199 Greenfield, 2007, p. 53
200 Id., p. 61
201 Reppas, 1999, p. 921. On the other hand, some claim that bribery was simply “normal practice” and so not
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202 Greenfield, 2007, pp. 51-54
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49
excavation is being conducted which led to its eventual disuse.207 At the time, in 1912,
Egypt was under British colonial rule, but the Nefertiti Bust was in fact excavated by a
privately-funded German excavation team.208 There  are  two  main  questions  that  may  be
seen as wrongful in the Nefertiti Bust case. First of all, there were some uncertainties in the
division of the finds: “it seems to be very likely that [the head of the excavation team,
Ludwig] Borchardt, eager to preserve the bust of Nefertiti for Germany, either did not
reveal the find to the Egyptian antiquities authority ... at all or diligently hid the bust
underneath some unimportant antiquities or [the Egyptians’ representative, though French,]
Gustave Lefebvre as an epigraphist and papyrologist did not recognize the importance of
the  bust  of  Nefertiti.”209 Stephen Urice, however, points out that Borchardt did in fact
publish the bust already in 1913 “in an academic journal that would have been widely read
and circulated among Egyptologists.”210 Despite a partial image, Egypt’s antiquities
officials would, according to Urice, known the bust is in Germany and would have known
about its importance, yet made no claim (Urice does not present any factual proof of this,
though211). The second argument regarding the wrongfulness of the removal of the Bust is,
that at the time Egyptians were under colonial rule and had fairly little control over matters
such as the dispersal of its antiquities. The Egyptian Antiquities authority was headed by
foreigners (for a very long time by Frenchmen), and the division in the partage was
overseen by the French Lefebvre.212 Urice, however, argues that partage was a commonly
used and accepted system and in the case at hand, was not notably unbeneficial to Egypt.
Indeed the partage system created under Egyptian law benefited both Germany and Egypt
exactly as intended: by offering tangible rewards for the risky investment in an
archaeological expedition, Egypt gained knowledge of its own history and collections of
antiquities acquired through scientific excavation. Germany gained prestige for discovery,
valuable objects for its museums, and standing within the international archaeological
community. Accordingly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find any historical wrong that
would be “righted” by return of the bust.213
One final case involving colonialism worth comparing here is the Icelandic
Manuscripts case between Iceland and Denmark, which revolved around a vast collection
207 Merryman, Elsen & Urice, 2007b, p. 414. Recently some scholars have, however, petitioned for the
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of medieval manuscripts – and especially two priceless books (Codex Regius and
Flateyjarbók) – written in Iceland and collected to Denmark (competing against Sweden)
in late 17th and early 18th centuries.214 There are several points of importance here: first, it
has  been  said  that  the  manuscripts  are  almost  all  the  cultural  property  Iceland  has,  “the
oldest living literature in Europe”215,  and  the  value  of  the  manuscripts  (especially  the
aforementioned books) is beyond measure; and second, it is one of the few instances where
a return has been successfully agreed upon through diplomatic negotiations. At the time,
Iceland was a colony of Denmark, and had little say in such a campaign launched by the
Danish scholars (and, for the most part, probably did not have much interest, either).216
However, when Iceland gained its independence, the cultural and ideological importance
of the manuscripts had sunk into the national consensus of the Icelanders – they had played
a great deal in the inspiration and justification for the independence campaign.217 What
ensued was a diplomatic and political arm-wrestle between the two nations that lasted for
decades and at times enflamed the relations between them. Those in opposition of the
return said that the manuscripts were in fact pan-Scandinavian and that Iceland would not
be able to preserve them correctly (an argument discussed below). However, the result was
gained purely through diplomatic negotiations without any legal action, and although the
solution meant dividing the collection, this ensured not only that both the nations would be
pleased with the result, but that by making sure that the scholars in each nation had steady
access to the collections in each nation, the spirit of collaboration would continue. It also
means that the Icelandic people can perhaps feel some sense of reconciliation with the
cultural property that had been missing for over two centuries.218
4.5. Ownership
There is one strong way, in a sense, to counter the wrongful taking argument (as well as, in
essence, any argument), which is what Prott and O’Keefe call the “Ownership” argument:
214 The books are medieval saga literature of Iceland and include some of the only surviving pieces of the
famous mythologies of the age. The collection has been named after the Icelandic scholar Arní Magnússon,
who was responsible for the physical collection of the majority of the manuscripts, scouring for them in the
most unlikely places all around Iceland (including such used as padding in clothing (Magnusson, 2007, p.
3)). Magnússon had a chair in the University of Copenhagen, to which he bequeathed all the manuscripts he
had collected (at least those that had survived the Great Fire of Copenhagen). For a full history of the
Manuscripts (including the restitution debate), see Greenfield, 2007, pp. 13-40; Magnusson, 2007, pp. 1-4.
215 Magnusson, 2007, p. 3
216 Greenfield, 2007, p. 13
217 Magnusson, 2007, pp. 3-4; Greenfield, 2007, p. 19
218 Greenfield, 2007, pp. 13-40
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A simple argument made by the holders of cultural property being sought by its country of
origin is to rely on the status quo. Institutions in collecting countries have possession, have
ownership according to their own domestic law and according to their view of international
law. Why should they then hand over these goods?219
The argument, as stated above, relies on the status quo.220 Of course, the laws (especially
domestic laws) do support this stance, and there is little other states can do if the
withholding country refuses to return the object or even cooperate altogether (there is,  of
course,  always the possibility of raising a domestic case in the holding country – and on
(rare) occasion such a case may even be successful).221 There are very differing views on
what the international law in the matter is, whether there is customary law and whether it is
binding. While the retentionist argument is, of course, that there is no customary
international  law to  compel  return  (at  least  in  cases  from prior  to  1970 –  the  year  of  the
Unesco 1970 treaty), some have argued that such a custom has emerged.222 In the case of
institutions like the British Museum, there are also laws in place that make it very difficult
to make such a return, even if the museum itself would so wish to do. In Britain, such an
action would apparently require an act of parliament.223 The other counterpoint against the
ownership argument is that even though the law may be on their side, the moral argument
has, or should have, considerable weight – and if the law is against morality, then often the
law isn’t considered just.224 Of  course,  a  moral  argument  is  always  to  some  extent
subjective – and as such debatable. Still, it can also be said, that “[t]he very nature of the
question of restitution calls for opposing moral law to the stricto senso juridical one.”225
4.6. Preservation
Most,  if  not  all,  would  surely  agree  that  the  most  important  thing  in  regards  to  cultural
property  is  the  preservation  of  the  objects  (unless  talking  about  very  specific  types  of
objects like human remains or objects with ritualistic or other use that are meant to be
consumed – in this case opinions vary more). As an argument, it is almost exclusively used
to  support  the  retention  of  cultural  property.  Prott  and  O’Keefe  list  Conservation  as  an
219 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 844
220 Id., p. 844
221 Reppas, 1999, pp. 945-946
222 Id., pp. 958-970
223 Greenfield, 2007, pp. 103-110
224 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, pp. 844-845
225 Gazi, 1990a, p. 131
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argument for retention,226 and in the value model of Bator, the Preservation value is a
fundamental one.227
The most usual type of preservation argument is that the source nation does
not have adequate facilities and resources to take care of the objects.228 This can, of course,
be a legitimate concern and needs to be seriously considered. However, there are many
responses to such a claim. First of all, “it is argued that this is now no excuse for non-return
since such conditions can be provided, either in existing institutions, or by way of aid from
the holding country, or from an international organization.”229 Also it is questioned
whether such sophisticated conservation techniques are needed “since many of these
objects originally came from a tropical environment and were conserved by local
craftsmen long before their removal from the country of origin”, although there is always
the possibility that the exposure to the new conditions has made the item more susceptible
to decay in the original conditions.230 Another important way the conservation argument is
used is not so much about the preservation of the object but rather its security. There have
been occasions of theft soon after the objects’ restitution, for example, ”it has been
reported that objects returned to Zaire from Belgium [in 1976] have reappeared on the
international market.”231
The greatest risk in this argument is that it is used as an excuse from
considering any restitution claims, as very few institutions can match the facilities of, for
instance, the British Museum. In this way, it could always be argued that in restitution
there is a greater risk to the object than at the current location, and that the status quo
should be retained. There is a high risk of imperialism in this kind of thinking, since the
Western states that retain these objects are in a notably better financial position than many
of the countries claiming restitution and can probably stay one step ahead of most of the
countries of origin, in terms of preservation capabilities. However, even if a state has
weaker facilities for conservation of cultural property, it doesn’t mean the facilities aren’t
226 Id., pp. 847-848
227 Bator, 1982, pp. 295-298
228 For example in the Benin Bronzes case, the British Museum eventually backed out on a loan of an ivory
mask it had already agreed upon with Nigeria, saying that the item in question cannot leave its carefully
controlled environment. To the Nigerians this seemed disingenuous, as in Nigeria was the original place
where the item had been made and stored, while the British Museum countered that it was the worst possible
environment to begin with. (Chamberlin, 1983, p. 204)
229 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 848
230 Id., p. 848
231 Greenfield, 2007, p. 410; Hallman, 2005, p. 215
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good enough.232 And, as already stated, one possibility is that if the source country doesn’t
have proper capabilities for preservation, the other state could support them.233 After  all,
when considering things like justice, one cannot only consider the present but also the past
is to be taken into consideration, and if the status quo is to be preserved, then the future
must also be in consideration.
As usual, the preservation argument has been actively used in the Parthenon
Sculptures case. The biggest problem in regards to sending the marbles to Athens has been
the intense air pollution the marbles left in the Parthenon have suffered from.234 Acid rains
have dissolved a lot of the surface remaining marbles and the ones taken by Elgin have a
distinct difference in level of preservation (of course, Elgin took those best preserved to
begin with).235 While this was a very legitimate claim some decades ago, in recent times
there has been a significant change in circumstances that question this argument. To begin
with, the city of Athens successfully took steps to bring down at least some of the pollution
levels in the city. The real difference is, however, the construction of the Acropolis
Museum which was finally finished in 2009. This is where the marbles would now be
situated in, in a dedicated space under expert care (that cannot be said to be notably worse
than that which the Sculptures receive in the British Museum), so it could not be claimed
that the Sculptures would be in any more danger there.236 In this way, the claim acts as a
valid argument for retention up until a certain point, but for future retention has lost much
(if not all) of its basis. Often the argument also goes, that if Elgin wouldn’t have removed
the Marbles for the British,  someone else – quite likely the French – would have.237 The
same argument was in use already by the French in the invasion of Italy in the end of the
18th century.238
In addition, the large Western museums themselves do not have a perfect
track record of safe preservation of the objects. Even regarding the Parthenon Sculptures in
the British Museum, it has become revealed that in addition to the damage done in the
232 See for example Gazi, 1990a, p. 132; Goepfert, 1995, p. 514
233 Prott & O’Keede, 1989, p.848
234 Reppas, 1999, pp. 936-938
235 King, 2006, p. 305-306;
236 Reppas, 1999, pp. 936-937. The idea of situating the Marbles anywhere other than physically back to the
Parthenon (even if they would be within view of it) does, however, raise other objections regarding the
meaningfulness of such a relocation (from one museum to another; this is discussed further in chapter 4.9.). It
has, however, been argued that the way the Marbles are placed in the British Museum also distorts the view
and understanding of the Marbles (Gazi, 1990b, p. 246)
237 Merryman, 1985, pp. 1905-1906
238 Merryman, 2005, p. 15
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extraction phase, there has been great damage inflicted upon them during their stay in the
British Museum. In 1930, the marbles were being moved to a new location in the Museum,
the Duveen Gallery, funded by the now-infamous arts dealer Robert Duveen. During this
project, Duveen had the sculptures scrubbed of their rather brown patina, so as to adhere to
the image of whiteness the general public associated with ancient marble statuary (a
picture which was, in fact, false, as even at the time experts knew that in ancient times the
statues had been painted with bright colors)239. This was done with methods that were even
at the time coarse, at times even removing the original sculpting marks (and of course the
patina which would hold important trails for modern researchers to study, for example, the
paint used) and did damage that, according to some, “cannot be exaggerated”240. The job
was not finished, however, and some of the marbles still have borders between the
scrubbed and unscrubbed surfaces. After the damage was understood by the museum staff,
it seems that the whole affair was also covered up as best as possible, only to be revealed
as late as 1984 by exerts from a curator’s diary.241 On the other hand, Dorothy King has
argued that similar techniques have been used in Greece until much later, and that the lack
of openness makes it much more difficult to know what types of methods the Sculptures in
Greece have been cleaned with:
The British Museum has to disclose information about the Parthenon Marbles in London
under the Freedom of Information Act. There is no such law in Greece, and curators have
not been forthcoming about past cleanings of the Athens marbles, so we will never know
what was done to them over the years. We only know that the Greeks continued to ‘clean’
ancient sculpture with steel chisels long after the British abandoned this technique as too
abrasive.242
4.7. Accessibility, ambassador
An interesting point of discussion in the cultural property debate relates to – although is
clearly distinct from – the discussion about proper context. A common claim by those in
support of the universal museums is that in such a museum, the objects are seen by far
more people than in their original context, and so also educates the public about art from
239 St Clair, 2006, p. 82 (and in general, pp. 82-94)
240 Reppas, 1999, p. 938
241 Id., pp. 938-944. On the other hand, some claim the damage done at this point has been highly
exaggerated by William St Clair who first wrote about them, that his account was erroneous and that the
account was never covered up like he claimed. See Jenkins, 2001; Boardman, 2000 pp.241-257.
242 King, 2006, p. 307; on her observations regarding the condition of the Athens marbles, and some
speculations about aggressive cleaning methods based on the “surprising, even shocking” whiteness of the
marbles there, pp. 306-307
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outside their culture and knowledge, inspires future art and research, and, probably most
importantly, advances cultural coexistence and collaboration. On the other hand, the other
side argues that in the West, the pieces are only seen by a limited, well-doing few (who
would  usually  also  be  able  to  afford  to  visit  them  anywhere  else),  and  such  a  location
excludes  a  majority  of  the  people  in  the  world,  especially  those  in  the  poor  Third  World
countries where the pieces originate from. This is a many-sided argument, and is often
infused with other arguments. In the value-based categorization, Urice lists the value of
‘making art known, visible and accessible’, which is very similar to the ‘art as good
ambassador’ value.243 Prott and O’Keefe also have the ‘access’ argument.244
Of course, the argument about the objects working as a cultural ambassador
is applicable to all restitution cases, and in itself does not differ from case to case. The idea
is  that  when  an  art-rich  country  lets  its  art  spread  into  museums  around  the  world,  it
“stimulates interest in, understanding of, and sympathy and admiration for that country.”245
In addition, “an equitable distribution of a nation’s cultural  property also contributes to a
breakdown in parochialism and builds mutual respect and admiration for other cultural
traditions.”246
In many of the cases under comparison here, the argument has been made
that the bringing of the items into the Western museums is what has made them so famous
and valuable and iconic in the first place (as has already been mentioned). And the boom
hasn’t only included the specific cultural objects, but all the cultural property of the culture
which has produced them. Through the acquisition of these objects into the great museums,
it is said, the ancient Greeks and Egyptians (and any other such cultures) have gained
newfound prestige and respect for their achievements.247 For example, when the Parthenon
Sculptures became available in Britain, “[o]ne result was that Greek superseded Roman art
as the ideal, both in high and in popular culture.”248 Another  result,  according  to  J.
243 Urice, 2006, pp. 148-151, 154
244 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, pp. 845-847. Many of these values are represented in the 1976 UNESCO
Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural Property: “the circulation of cultural
property... is a powerful means of promoting mutual understanding and appreciation among nations. [A]
systematic policy of exchanges.., would not only be enriching to all parties but would also lead to a better use
of the international community's cultural heritage which is the sum of all the national heritages.” (Merryman,
1998b, p. 11, quoting the 1976 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of
Cultural Property, Nov. 26, 1976, preamble)
245 Bator, 1982, p. 306
246 Urice, 2006, p. 154
247 King, 2006, p. 299
248 Merryman, 1985, p. 1908
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Rothenberger, was that the whole attitude towards antiques changed: they were no longer
seen as primarily decorative, but rather as educational and public objects.249 Merryman
argues  in  similar  lines,  saying,  that  “[b]y  their  removal  to  London  and  exposure  in  the
British Museum, they have brought admiration and respect for the Greek achievement” and
that “[i]n the most important sense the Greek cultural heritage has been preserved,
arguably enhanced, by the British acquisition and display of the Marbles.”250 Similarly, a
newfound boom of Egyptology coincided with the publicizing of many of the most
important Egyptian artifacts, as has been mentioned before.251
In a way an even larger impact was created by the Benin Bronzes. According
to Neil MacGregor the Bronzes “did more than anything else to change European
perceptions of Africa.”252 Once they became revealed – and clear that they were, in fact,
African (and not, for example, from Atlantis, as some speculated)253 –   “a  whole  set  of
stereotypes collapsed; a whole set of hierarchies disintegrated”254 and African culture
overall became appreciated as more than just that of primitives and inferior to the
Europeans.255
There  are  also  advantages  still  to  be  gained.  According  to  Bator,  “[g]iving
foreigners a taste of a nation's art by allowing export will attract foreign scholars, students,
and tourists to visit that country and study its art; this can in turn stimulate and enrich that
country's intellectual life.”256 The benefits aren’t only economic, or national, as “a more
cosmopolitan learning and better international understanding result from exposure to the
works of other cultures.”257
Finally, there is the question of access (or distribution). This can be
understood in several ways. Merryman explains this principle in general terms: “that all of
mankind has a reasonable opportunity for access to its own and other people's cultural
achievements.”258 Most  often  the  argument  is  understood  as  maximizing  the  amount  of
people that can see the pieces in question, for artistic reasons, and by the accessibility for
249 Id., 1908
250 Id., p. 1913
251 Miles, 2008, pp. 328-329
252 MacGregor, 2009, p. 51
253 Id., pp. 51-52
254 Id., p. 52
255 Greenfield, 2007, pp. 410-411; Klug, 2010, p. 722; Chamberlin, 1983, p. 194
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scholarly research – because “[p]resumably, we preserve art so that it can be seen and
known and studied, so that it can exercise its power over us, so that it can add to our store
of knowledge.”259 It is, naturally, important that the pieces of cultural property don’t just
lay unused and unseen in storage. The argument is usually given in favor of retention of
the objects: where they are being held, far more people will be able to have access to them,
because of either the popularity of the location overall (for example, as a tourist hub – like
London), or as a safe, secure and accessible location to visit, or due to the way the supply
of cultural property is handled in the other country (how they are held in storage (or on
display), accessibility for scholars, bureaucracy). Especially in regards to the British
Museum these arguments are often deployed, speaking of the centrality and safety of
London, and its openness for scholarly research. For example, Dorothy King recites her
personal experiences of difficulties when studying Greek archaeological sculptures in
Greece,260 while the Marbles in the British Museum “could not be more accessible than
they are now.”261
These last-mentioned arguments have received lots of strong criticism.
Critics claim that these ideas are merely nationalist arguments disguised in internationalist
rhetoric, and in fact maintain the imperialist attitude that was responsible for receiving
these items in the first place. It is also said, that such an internationalist view “advances the
distrusting view that antiquities are the property of all humankind for both highly-
developed and under-developed nations, but safe for display only in westernized nations”
(dealing  also  with  the  protection  argument)  and  that  “by  forcing  art-rich  nations  to
‘disperse’ their cultural assets, ‘western’ nations are essentially stealing.”262
Another problem, perhaps an even more important one, is “that all the
museums that fall into the ‘universal’ category are in the Western States.”263 Such  a
location excludes all the poor people around the world and especially those from Third
World countries (where the objects often originate from) and “not one is easily accessible
to scholars in developing countries.”264 This means that scholars from the items’
originating country are hindered in the research of their own culture. Any bad relations of
the museums currently holding the items with the items’ country of origin “could in the
259 Bator, 1982, p. 299
260 King, 2006, pp. 304-305
261 Boardman, 2000, p. 260
262 Klug, 2010. p. 720
263 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 846
264 Id., p. 850
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long run seriously impair the opportunities for research and collection abroad.”265 If,
instead, good relations were upheld (through restitution and cooperation projects), it would
be an advantage for both the parties (and the public overall through better research).266 It is
often added that those in the rich Western countries would instead have much better
prerequisites for seeing the objects in their source nations, while there also would be the
chance for the locals to see the items.267 Elazar Barkan also disputes that the Western
museums would be so much more open in their collections, saying instead, “that major
museums hoard, and deny access to, multitudes of objects in their basements.”268 Finally, it
could be argued that where the tourists now flock to see certain high-profile cultural
objects in a museum in one place, if the object were transferred to a different (the original)
location, some, if not most, of those tourists would go see them in the other location.
To be considered with the values relating to scholarly and other such access
is also one interesting point of discussion relating to the Rosetta Stone,269 one which here
could be called the usefulness argument. Regarding the Rosetta Stone, there have been –
often as a side-note discussing other cases – many mentions of its past contribution to
science, as it was the key to understanding Egyptian hieroglyphs. The interesting thing is
that what this past importance means for authors in regards to its allocation. King, arguing
against the return of the Parthenon Sculptures, says that because of its importance in
unlocking the hieroglyphics and giving access to “several thousand years of history and
ancient culture in Egypt”,270 there  is  a  much  better  case  for  restitution.  It  is,  King
apparently argues, the link between modern and ancient Egypt, while the Parthenon
Sculptures (not even being the best ancient Greek sculpture available)271, have no such
meaning.272 On the other hand, Christopher Hitchens, arguing for the return of the
265 Id., p. 844
266 Id., pp. 843-844 (the ”dynamics of collecting” argument)
267 Id., pp. 846-847; St Clair, 2006, pp. 94-95. Prott & O’Keefe also argue that ”[i]f universal museums are
essential, then there should be one on at least each continent, not all concentrated in the same socio-cultural
area.” (p. 846)
268 Barkan, 2002, p. 31. The same is said by Patty Gerstenblith: “However, the museums of North America
and Western Europe are also filled with art works and antiquities, which are often in storage, displayed
occasionally, sometimes uncatalogued and not necessarily accessible to either the general public or for
scholarly research. This may well be part of good museum practice, but museums in archaeologically-rich
countries also have reasons for what is displayed or not, and for keeping excavated material in the region, and
they should not be singled out for practices that are normal elsewhere.” (Gerstenblith, 2001, p. 209)
269 On the history of the Rosetta Stone as well as arguments for retention, see Shuart, 2004.
270 King, 2006, p. 310
271 Id., p. 305
272 Id.,  p.  310.  King does  not,  however,  seem to  actually  endorse  the  return  –  stating  only  that  ”on purely
technical grounds” the return would make more sense that the return of the Marbles, but implying that other
factors do not support such an action for the Rosetta Stone either.
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Parthenon Sculptures, states that “[t]he Rosetta Stone belongs to humanity273, in that it
helped the world decode a script that is no longer in Egyptian usage, and is as well off in
the British Museum or in the Louvre, or, if chance had so dictated, in the national museum
in Cairo.”274 Hitchens draws on the fact that it doesn’t have any inherent meaning for the
current Egyptians, and was utilized by the world in collaboration when solving the
hieroglyphs, so there is no need for its return.275
Stephen Urice has also hoped to raise a new value that is related to that of
access: ‘protecting the stream of creative expression’.
Living artists rely on and react to their predecessors; they create new works in the context
of the creative expressions. As the individuals who maintain the ancient tradition of
creating cultural heritage, they have interests that are entitled to special consideration in
cultural property discussions.276
There are many types of artistic and cultural endeavors that require access to such creations
of the past.277 To support the continuation of such creativity, these artist need to be given
access to pieces that might not be quite as accessible otherwise. As an example of this, he
raises a case regarding the Nefertiti Bust, the work called The Body of Nefertiti. This was a
case of “appropriation art”; that is, not merely using earlier works (and other objects) as
inspiration but incorporating them in the new work.278 In 2003 two Hungarian artists used
the Bust as basis to create a bronze figure – the rest of the body – proportionate to the bust.
In  the  same  year,  the  sculpture  was  taken  to  the  Egyptian  Museum  in  Berlin,  and  for  a
short while the head was attached to the body, to create a complex installation piece,
including a “full” figure of Nefertiti. The Egyptian officials’ reaction, however, was
extremely negative, culminating in the head of Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities
proclaiming that the head of the Berlin Museum (and his wife) would be banned from all
future excavations in Egypt, and that any Egyptian officials should not cooperate with
273 In accordance with the basic idea of cultural internationalism, as opposed to the cultural nationalistic idea
of the piece belonging to the Egyptian nation.
274 Hitchens, 2008b, p. xxii
275 The argument of course follows that the Parthenon Sculptures, on the other hand, do have such meaning –
directly conflicting the view held by King. These arguments about the Rosetta Stone are also made by Shuart,
2004, pp. 695-697
276 Urice, 2006, p. 156
277 And, in fact, art is always based on inspiration from past art (even if the new piece is a kind of antithesis
to the old). Id., pp. 156-157
278 Id., pp. 157-162
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them in any way. In other words, then, the piece wouldn’t have been allowed such usage in
Egypt, and the stream of creative expression would have been halted.279
4.8. Domino effect
A kind of last-resort argument, yet also one that tends to be applicable in all cases (and is
often voiced, especially by those speaking on behalf of the universal museums), is the
‘need to maintain Western collections’, or ‘domino effect’ argument.280 Urice speaks of the
‘floodgates concern’.281 Many  of  those  arguing  for  the  retention  of  cultural  property,
especially when speaking about very high-profile items like the Parthenon Sculptures and
Nefertiti’s Bust, have expressed a fear that if such items were made to be returned, this
would set a precedent of restitution, as a result of which “any country who owns and
displays a work originating from another country would be subject to the claim of superior
title by the country of origin”.282 The result would be that a high-profile return (like that of
the  Marbles)  would  result  in  “the  universal  removal  of  major  acquisitions  of  the  world’s
museums” and “museums as we know them today, will be destroyed completely.”283 Even
accepting some smaller-profile requests might accomplish this, as such actions could cause
a flood of requests to which the museums would no longer have an acceptable reason for
denial.284 Perhaps even “the return of ... one object will lead to an uncontrolled and
uncontrollable set of demands for return.”285
This argument, however, has been refuted by the opposing side in the debate.
Some argue that there is no tenability whatsoever in this claim. They say that since, for
example, “the British Museum has already returned some objects to countries of origin ...
this seems a strange argument.”286 It is extremely rare (and not very credible) that such a
279 Id., pp. 162-165. This is, of course, one important value amongst many others, as long as the piece itself is
not  harmed.  There  was  no  physical  damage  to  the  Bust  during  the  process,  but  for  example  the
aforementioned head of the Antiquities Council, Zahi Hawass, called the piece “a ‘degradation’ of the Bust,
created in wanton disrespect’”. Whether this sort of “immaterial” damage is to be included in such an
evaluation is, however, a matter better suited for consideration elsewhere.
280 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, pp. 849-850
281 Urice, 2006, pp. 154-156 (and lists yet another name used for the argument (coined by Daniel Shapiro),
“the pandora’s box”)
282 Reppas, 1999, p. 978. See also Ounanian, 2007, pp. 122-123
283 Id., p. 978
284 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 849
285 Urice, 2006, p. 155
286 Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 849. The same argument is made by Greenfield: ”such ’returns’ have taken
place under different guises in the past and that it is by no means a novel occurrence setting into motion
unacceptable precedents.” (Greenfield, 2007, p. xiii)
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demand for all items in foreign lands to be made,287 and when instead only one item is
claimed for return, each claim will be handled on a case-by-case basis. And since in each
situation the facts are different, there will not be a universal precedent set.288 Others do,
however, say that what is established is – while not a universal precedent – “a very narrow
precedent,”289 for example, in the case of the Parthenon Sculptures, a precedent focusing
“solely upon immoveable property, not moveable property”290 because the sculptures are a
part of the larger structure of the Parthenon and never meant to be removed or transferred
from place to place.291 Or, alternatively (and this would be a more common practice), a
precedent focusing on the circumstances of the removal of the object. Where there have
been morally wrongful means of acquiring the objects – for example deception, theft or
pillage – there would be an obligation for return, while in a case where the objects have
been acquired through legal and agreeable methods, no such obligation would be born.292
4.9. Integrity
One more argument to consider is the Set Value293, or, in other words, the integrity of an
object, collection or monument. As Stephen Urice puts it:
Some objects of cultural property were intended to be independent works; others were
intended to be components of a complex work. In situations in which an object of cultural
property  derives  from  a  complex  work  or  is  part  of  a  series  or  set,  this  set  value  is  a
relevant consideration in weighing a demand for return.
When a piece of cultural property is divided, “each [piece] has less cultural value when
separated than as a unit.”294 The Set Value argument has been used for either side of the
debate. John Henry Merryman has categorized the argument as internationalist, which has
been criticized by Ana Sljivic. For her, “it is likely that integrity would, in many instances,
lean in favor of location of the object in the source nation.”295
287 It is not unheard of, though – for example in 1965 Greece made such a demand. (King, 2006, p. 296)
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conducted around the world, each irreplaceably destroying archaeological information due to the lack of
documentation. According to Merryman: “[u]nless removal is accompanied by elaborate documentation of
the site, it leads to the irreparable loss of cultural information. It is a form of destruction, a kind of
vandalism.” (Id., p.503)
295 Sljivic, 1998, p. 414 footnote 156
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The Parthenon Sculptures are, once again, a prime example of the Set Value
argumentation. Not only were they designed as an inseparable part of a yet much greater
building (immoveable cultural  property,  as stated above),  but as a whole they also “tell  a
story about religious belief and life in ancient Athens; a story only truly understood when
the frieze is viewed as a whole.”296 When separated, the narrative is broken and the story
the sculptures are meant to convey is missing important pieces. Christopher Hitchens has
compared the division of the sculptures to that of sawing a painting like the Mona Lisa in
half and shipping the two parts into different countries.297 Of course, some have argued
that this unity is unachievable anyways – and so the argument loses much of its basis – as,
“[i]n  terms  of  sculpture,  at  most  half  is  preserved.”298 Still,  one  could  make  a
counterargument by asking that if a sculpture has irreplaceably lost some part(s) of it,
would it be acceptable, then, to divide up the rest of it to different places. However, it is
also true that in terms of the story the marbles have to tell, much of it is lost no matter if
the remaining pieces are together or separate. And it cannot be claimed that in scholarly
terms (in regard to the narrative of the sculptures) much would most likely be gained from
the reuniting, as the research and reproductions have, for the most part, already been made.
The question is more that of aesthetics. However, Andromache Gazi has argued that the
way they are displayed in the British Museum distorts the view and understanding of the
Marbles because it “is a display totally alien to the original placement of the sculptured
panels on the monument.”299 In  returning  the  pieces  to  Athens,  there  is  also  the  problem
that they would not be placed back on the Parthenon due to environmental hazards, but
instead in the Acropolis Museum (as mentioned before). This has led those against
restitution to question the meaningfulness of such a return, as in the museum the integrity
of the Parthenon would be no more repaired than they are now.300 Those in favor of return,
on  the  other  hand,  claim that  in  the  Acropolis  Museum the  Marbles  are  in  their  original
context, as well as in a more original display.301
The situation is yet slightly different in the case of collections of items.
Where in the case of the Parthenon Sculptures the integrity comes from their original
immovability from the same structure, as well as the narrative they have to tell, the case of
296 Ounanian, 2007, p. 114
297 Id., p. 114
298 King, 2006, p. 303
299 Gazi, 1990b, p. 246
300 Merryman, 1985, pp. 1918-1919. See also Shuart, 2004, pp. 675-676; King, 2006, p. 303
301 Hitchens, 2008c, pp. 152-153; Greenfield, 2007, pp. 83-84; Gazi, 1990b, p. 246
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collections (or ensembles) can be more difficult to determine. One could, for example, look
at the case of the Benin Bronzes, where the multitude of items were from the same source,
but have not been treated as a single collection, having rather been dispersed in a multitude
of museums around the world.302 In addition, there are duplicates of same and similar items
– some of which have been the subject of return by the British Museum to Nigeria,
precisely because they have been considered duplicate and, apparently, not a distinct part
of an inseparable set (but rather a loose collection of similar items, but not clearly
possessing separate value as a collection overall).303 A slightly more contested case is the
Nefertiti Bust. Having been found in the remains of the workshop of the sculptor,
Thutmose, with a range of other items, it has been suggested that, should Egypt determine
that the collection and workshop is possible to re-establish in a museum, the set should be
recollected.304 According to Kurt Siehr:
It has long been recognized by archaeologists, art historians, museum curators and even
politicians that objects of cultural property should not be dismembered and, if this had
happened in the past, such a mutilation of objets d’art should be stopped and dispersed
pieces of an ensemble should be reassembled.305
Stephen Urice, however, denies that the Bust is a part of a collection, saying instead that it
“is an independent work, not part of a complex work or a series requiring reunification to
achieve full meaning.”306 Still,  the majority of his arguments (though not as important as
the first one) against restitution rely more on matters of practicality. According to him, the
idea that all the pieces found in Thutmose’s workshop would be displayed together is
unrealistic: in reality too many of the works found there are uninteresting to non-specialists
(whom can easily access the pieces in the current museums), and displaying the Bust in
such a way would be unpractical because of the quantity of visitors wishing to see it. The
idea of reuniting sets also doesn’t resolve where such a unification should occur.307
302 Greenfield, 2007, pp. 124-125
303 Id., pp. 125-129
304 Siehr, 2006, pp. 126-128
305 Id., 127 (emphasis original)
306 Urice, 2006, p. 148
307 Id., p. 148. The argument about the reunification not necessarily meaning return (and hence not in itself
working as an argument for restitution) has also been presented in the Parthenon Sculptures case.
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5. Other Faces of Cultural Property
The previous chapter explored the arguments presented for the restitution and retention of
cultural property. The debate revealed arguments that are common to many cases, but often
have individual qualities between cases that make generalizations difficult. It also revealed
that for almost every argument, there is a counter-argument, and that it is extremely
difficult to come to any conclusions regarding the optimal allocation of cultural property.
Now, before addressing the application of the structure of the debate, I will shift my focus
to how both cultural property and the debate surrounding it can be used to advance other
agendas, in order to show that these phenomena do not exist in a vacuum, but are, in fact,
inextricably linked to real-world politics. What is shown is a field even more complex than
at first revealed by the debate over restitution, but sometimes hidden in the rhetoric of
cultural property in general.
5.1. Cultural property in history/memory politics
Heritage passions impact myriad realms of life today. They play a vital role in national and
ethnic conflict, in racism and resurgent genetic determinism, in museum and
commemorative policy, in global theft, illicit trade, and rising demands for repatriating art
and antiquities. Decisions about what to conserve and what to jettison, about parenthood
and adoption, about killing or converting or cosseting those of rival faiths all invoke
heritage to explain how we feel and to validate how we act.308
Cultural property, for all its emotional and symbolic power (or, as Merryman said, mana),
can be and often is “put to a variety of political uses in a variety of political contexts –
ethnic, regional, and national”309, much like history overall (though it is important to keep
‘heritage’ and ‘history’ clearly separate from each other)310. As has been suggested before,
not all the discussion regarding the restitution of cultural property innocently considers
only the most optimal location of the piece. There are various goals that the actors wish to
attain through either the retention or restitution of the objects in debate.
In fact, James Cuno claims that cultural property overall is a political
construct. This also means that it is “whatever one sovereign authority claims it to be.”311
308 Lowenthal, 1998, p. xiv. It is important to note that Lowenthal is speaking here of heritage in a very broad
sense.
309 Merryman, 1989, p. 350
310 ”History explores and explains pasts grown ever more opaque over time; heritage clarifies pasts so as to
infuse them with present purposes.” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. xv)
311 Cuno, 2008, p. 9
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As something that is central to the identity of the people, Cuno does, however, speak
against the inclusion of antiquities into this category. According to him, such items –
usually made by people without much traditional similarity to the people in the same area
now (sharing mainly just an approximate geographical location) – cannot have such a
meaning to current people other than as a political tool for nation-building (which always
also excludes other cultures that share or have shared the same location).312 On the other
hand, one could argue that if there is a continuity from the people of a culture (even though
the culture itself changes and perhaps is not recognized as the same culture anymore), and
even if the people themselves do not explicitly recognize this connection, there is always
some type of effect a past culture has on the culture in the present.313
In  a  time  of  memory  laws  and  restitutions  of  past  atrocities  such  as  the
Holocaust, the restitution of cultural objects can be seen as one such way, among others, to
ameliorate these old wounds.314 However,  some  have  also  warned  of  the  risk  of  the
restitution movement taking “on the trappings of political correctness.”315 As has been
stated, cultural property also has had and continues to have a great role in building a
national sense of identity, and so it is always an important tool for those in charge (and also
gives them the capacity for shaping this identity in the direction they may wish). It is also a
very important form of politics to decide who gets to decide on the cultural property in a
nation. One extreme such example was the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in
Afghanistan. Upon not considering the giant, incomparable Buddha statues part of their
cultural heritage,316 the Taliban went on to destroy this symbol of “gods of the infidels”317
as part of a religious-political purge of all non-Islamic material happening in the nation
(the museums were also razed, one of the greatest iconoclasms of our time).318 But
although they claimed it was purely an internal matter, in addition to this being a
scientifically and culturally important site for the whole world, it could also be considered
312 Id., pp. 9-11
313 Klug, 2010, p. 127
314 “The demand that nations act morally and amend their own gross historical injustices is a relatively new
phenomenon. ... Beginning at the end of World War II, however, and quickening since the end of the Cold
War, morality and justice have received growing attention as international political questions.” (Barkan,
2002, p. 16)
315 Klug, 2010, p. 721, quoting Solomon, Andrew: Art in Jeopardy in Who Owns the Past? Cultural Policy,
Cultural Property, and the Law (Fitz  Gibson,  Kate  ed.),  Rutgers  University  Press,  New  Brunswick,  New
Jersey, 2005, p. 239
316 Gillman, 2010, p. 12
317 Id., p. 9
318 Merryman, 2006b, p. 111
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an  ultimate  act  of  declining  Buddhists  –  especially  in  the  East  –  of  access  to  cultural
heritage of theirs.319
In  a  sense,  this  was  also  an  act  of  building  a  sense  of  national  identity,
making  sure  that  only  the  official  form  of  Islam,  supported  by  the  Taliban,  was  to  be
promoted in the country.320 However, in its common form, such a use of cultural property
is hardly as destructive, and very ordinary (in fact, it has in some form or another happened
(and is happening) in every nation). An example from Mexico is provided by Merryman:
The National Museum of Anthropology in Mexico City is an example of an extraordinarily
sophisticated and effective use of cultural property to instill a sense of national identity and
national pride. Like other culturally diverse nations, Mexico has found it difficult to resolve
nation-building problems. ... The Museum attempts to show the Mexican viewer that he is
part of a great nation in which elements of native pre-Columbian and introduced European
cultures have been combined to produce something important that is uniquely Mexican.
Mexicans from remote villages grow perceptibly in stature as they move from room to
room in the Museum, particularly on the upper floor, where the visual anthem to
nationalism reaches a crescendo.321
This kind of an exercise is not, however, limited only to Mexico, but can be
seen in any state in the world, any national museum, or anywhere where a choice is made
on what to put on display to represent a nation.322 This exercise does not, however, need to
be a conscious one. As cultural property is chosen to represent the identity of a nation,
some is necessarily also left out, proving that this action of nation-building through cultural
heritage is not necessarily at all as innocent and harmless as it may seem on the surface. It
can be one form of (again, intentional or unintentional) structural discrimination and
oppression, to leave some part of the population out of such a selection, perhaps with the
intention  of  assimilation  (such  was  also  often  the  case  in  colonialism  –  removing  the
cultural  property  of  the  colonial  subject,  in  order  to  deprive  them  of  their  original
culture)323. The case of the Afo-A-Kom provides such an example (though in reverse); as
319 Gillman, 2010, pp. 12-15. This also once again raises the question of who cultural property belongs to
(discussed in the previous chapter). The purely nationalistic claim would be that the Buddhas had been the
cultural property of the Afghan people, the statues residing within the jurisdiction of their state. However,
“given the continuance of ‘Great Vehicle’ Buddhism in both cultures, Tibetan and Japanese Buddhists might
reasonably think that the Buddhas were more a part of their heritage”, especially since “[i]t is clear that the
Taliban didn’t consider the Buddhas to be part of their heritage.” (Id., p. 12)
320 It can also be used as a way to promote a certain view of history, or even as pure propaganda. On how the
Soviet Union used cultural property in this way, see Grimsted, 2010
321 Merryman, 1989, p. 350
322 Nation-building through cultural heritage is especially relevant in postcolonial countries. (Pieterse, 2005,
p. 175). See also Davison, 2005
323 For example, the removal of the Throne of Menelik from Ethiopia by Italy was done with such intentions.
See Prott & O’Keefe, 1989, p. 843
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the outcry against the sale of the objects centered on its fundamental meaning to the tribe
of the Kom people, “to Cameroonians concerned with nation-building, the Afo-A-Kom
episode was at best an awkward event.”324 The history, as represented through cultural
property, is also useful in identifying oneself with such historical antecedents that are seen
as desirable, perhaps with the hopes of gaining some modern day prestige through
historical roots.325
Legends of origin and endurance, of victory or calamity, project the present back, the past
forward; they align us with forebears whose virtues we share and whose vices we shun. We
are apt to call such communion history, but it is actually heritage.326
For example, in the case of the Pergamon altar, held currently in Berlin, both Greece and
Turkey have identified themselves as the descendants of the cultures at the region at the
time. In addition, Turkey has sought to de-emphasize its “imperial, Ottoman past” in order
“to establish Anatolia (that is, the modern geography of Turkey) as ‘the cradle of
civilization.’”327 Furthermore,  in general,  all  of the West identifies itself  clearly in a very
specific historical target: “[j]ust like another product of the European Enlightenment, the
‘Nation,’ the ‘West’ has pushed to oblivion ‘the historical time of its non-existence’ and
imagined itself as the descendant of a distant and imaginary antiquity.”328 In Greece, these
kinds of perceived relations to ancient Greeks of Sparta and Athens was also used in order
to oust the reigning Ottomans out in the 19th century.329
The destruction of the cultural property of a nation is an extreme method that
has sometimes been used by conquerors in order to enforce an identity or culture that they
see  as  fit  or  useful,  or  even  merely  for  revenge.  Colonial  rule  was  no  stranger  to  such
action, as shown by the actions of Italy in Ethiopia (mentioned in the previous chapter).330
In World War II, as is known, the Nazis could be extremely ruthless, and, for example, in
Poland they “gutted Old Warsaw to obliterate an icon of Polish identity that postwar Poles
speedily rebuilt as a symbol of communal care.”331 In China, such iconoclasm has
324 Id., p. 351
325 Harrison, 2013, pp. 141-142. Such nation-building is, however, being challenged by globalization (Id., pp.
142-144)
326 Lowenthal, 1998, p. xv
327 Bilsel, 2000, p. 8
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329 Lowenthal, 1998, p. 199
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apparently happened over and over again with the changes of dynasties, but most recently
after Mao’s rise into power. But in China, the culture also stresses words over matter.332
The thing about cultural property, of course, is that it can usually be adjusted
to  fit  any  agenda.  The  French  revolution  is  a  perfect  example  of  this  –  after  a  phase  of
iconoclasm and wanton destruction of all things monarchical, the French actually turned to
use the old symbols and remnants of the ancient régime into symbols of the republic and,
most importantly, the Revolution. This was a nationalization of the formerly private
heritage – a trend that would continue in later generations all around Europe and
fundamentally change the way heritage in general was to be seen and understood.333
Cultural  property  is  a  way  to  alter  views  of  the  past.  By  promoting  certain  objects  over
others, by commemorating certain events in history (with, say, a monument) and leaving
others without mention, is  a way to alter the view of history of the public and promote a
world view of choice of those making the decisions.334
Cultural property can also lend itself to purely political uses. For example,
the  return  of  the  Crown  of  St.  Stephen  from  the  United  States  to  Hungary  in  1977  was
considered to strengthen the socialist government’s claim of legitimacy, which raised
political opposition from politicians and expatriate Hungarians. Similarly, in a return of
cultural property by the Netherlands to Indonesia, the act brought “personal gains for the
politicians who could claim credit for the event; partisan gains for the political group in
power in Indonesia at the time; a stronger cultural property base for nation-building in
Indonesia, and so on.”335 In  Britain,  Robert  Lumley  says,  the  cultural  property  debate  is
strongly  political  and  both  the  Left  and  Right  use  the  past  as  a  vital  source  of
legitimization.336 The political and popularity boost gained from being the person
responsible for the securing the return of an iconic piece of cultural property like the
Parthenon Sculptures would be massive, probably making the person a national hero,
making the restitution movement all the more popular – though also risking politicizing the
matter too far.337 In 2004 in Britain it was suggested that the Sculptures could be returned
332 Id., p. 20
333 Id., pp. 63-66
334 See in general Lowenthal, 1998; Lumley, 2005, pp. 23-25; Graham, Ashworth & Tunbridge, 2005, pp. 30-
31
335 Merryman, 1989, p. 351
336 Lumley, 2005, p. 17
337 Id., p. 351. The same could also be true in reverse in Britain – it is possible that the government
responsible for the restitution of the objects could be viewed in a negative light, though with the public being
more in favor of return than in the past, it might also be seen as a positive thing.
69
to Athens in return for Greece’s vote for Britain in the selection for the 2012 Olympic
Games.338 It is also possible to use cultural property demands to pressure the government
holding the objects in a completely unrelated matter, as Russell Chamberlin claims Nigeria
has done with the Benin Bronzes towards Britain.339
Sometimes the accusation has been made that the debate surrounding cultural
property is used to hide other issues. For example, according to John Boardman, Greek
governments “have been unabashed in stirring up the marbles controversy at various times
to mask other political dilemmas.”340 On the other side of the debate, there are also claims
that as some of the source nations are taking more strict actions against the deporting of
cultural objects they see as the nation’s cultural property, these “heavy-handed techniques
have given commentators the justification they previously lacked to criticize the once-
victimized source countries in the name of the museum community and private
collectors.”341
This use of cultural property in politics has been summed up by Can Bilsel:
[T]he discourse of restitution may gain a new dimension if we cease to consider
archaeological artifacts as mere cultural goods, but acknowledge their role in the modern
politics of memory. Central to the question of repatriation is not only the legitimacy of the
acquisition but the right to associate one’s collective identity with a powerful memory-
image.342
5.2. Cultural property and imperialism
It has already been established that many pieces of cultural property in museums like the
British Museum in Western states have been acquired with imperial power. In the history
of cultural property we also saw that the idea of a centralized collection of the most
magnificent art in the world has been an important part of warfare from Rome to Napoleon
and all the way to Nazi Germany. And there is certainly a risk involved in claiming that the
Western universal museums are the best possible placement for the cultural property of
cultures anywhere in the world. It is no surprise, then, that the accusation has sometimes
been made that these museums are upholding an imperialistic attitude or at least a longing
for their imperialistic past.
338 King, 2006, p. 298
339 Chamberlin, 1983, p. 206
340 Boardman, 2000, p. 258
341 Hoffman, 2010, p. 668
342 Bilsel, 2000, p. 15
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A great deal of the first universal museums and exhibitions were quite clearly
imperialistic by nature and method of acquisition. I have already talked about the many
ways in which the colonial hosts exploited and plundered the colonized lands. But perhaps
just as important in regards to the acquisition of cultural property was the indirect effect of
the  imperial  power.  It  wasn’t  only  that  in  cases  such  as  the  Parthenon  Sculptures  the
representatives of the Empire would have tremendous leverage to pressure or coax the
locals into giving or exchanging the objects, there were also, for example, many cases
where the colonial subjects would present lavish gifts to the Queen or her representatives,
for varying political purposes. For example many objects from India “appeared in the
exhibitions as tokens of loyalty to the heir to Queen Victoria, newly created Empress of
India, rather than examples of Indian manufacturers.”343 The exhibition of such items can
be  seen  also  as  show  of  power  of  the  Empire,  and  many  of  such  institutions  were
outspokenly “Imperial, rather than Metropolitan.”344
The imperialism involved in the acquisition of the collections in universal
museums (both in the way that the empires were able to gather the objects through their
power, as well as the way the objects were often chosen as trophies) does not only mean
that the collections may now uphold some remains of imperialism, there is also an effect
already imprinted on both the receiver and source of the objects. The museum in itself can
be seen as a kind of trophy case, and should the objects be returned, this would not change,
as the objects would certainly not be in their actual use anymore. “Indeed, the repatriation
of heritage objects often comes down to placing them in one’s own museum – an act which
perhaps establishes ownership, but only by reinterpreting cultural things in term of the
ideas  of  those  who  plundered  them.”345 In addition, there was often another imperial
narrative involved in the acquisition of such objects, where the justification for “the
destruction of the context that gave the objects their original meaning by reconceptualising
them as ‘works of art’ in accordance with post-romantic Western aesthetics.”346
Although, as has been established, often the imperialistic means of
acquisition of cultural property were morally questionable or outright wrongful, as also
343 Barringer, 1998, p.22
344 Id., p. 14, quoting Robinson, J.C. (1858): ‘Our national collection’, Athenaeum 1587, 27/3: 403-4, p. 404
345 Handler, 1985, p. 194
346 St. Clair, 2006, p. 76
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proven by the reactions of many of the members of the Empire,347 the actions were not
usually (at least technically) illegal by the laws of the time. This fact has been used as an
argument  also  in  current  debates  about  the  restitution  of  cultural  property,  as  without  an
illegal act of transfer, the current owners cannot (with very few exceptions) be compelled
by law to return those object. Although this is a valid argument, it also carries a high risk
of justification of past colonialism and upholding the imperialist attitudes of the past.
From the cultural nationalist view it is usually the internationalist that is
imperialistic, and in fact even the whole idea of internationalism may seem as (not-so-
)hidden imperialism. As the nationalist view focuses on the country of origin’s right to its
own cultural heritage, to such a view the idea that a state completely unrelated to it would
not only claim that it  is  an equally valid place of holding the objects,  but actually even a
better one, would be a thoroughly imperialistic idea. It would suggest that such a state is
claiming that it has a better position to determine over the cultural property over the state
of origin. There are also certain allusions to the idea of “the white man’s burden” in the
idea of a benevolence of preservation in the Western states’ collections of colonial cultural
properties.348
The invocation of imperialism is of course also a history-political action.
First of all, it can be that the (at least imagined) stability of the Empire of the past appeals
to people bemoaning the instability of our current age.349 It also cannot be denied that the
European colonizing states were superpowers in the world, something that can hardly be
said in the post-colonial world with new economic powerhouses around the world. This
made the situation for the powerful states much more secure. Secondly, upholding (even if
unintentionally) certain imperialistic traditions means that those in charge have much more
power especially in more indirect ways. Possessing masterpieces of cultural property
means also great financial benefits especially in the form of tourism.
Obviously not everyone agrees about the imperialism of the universal
museums. The internationalist ideology seems to do away with such an idea. For example,
John Boardman talks about the fact that it does not matter where these objects are located,
347 For example, see Barringer, 1998, pp. 21-22 for one example of such opposition, stating that “[t]hese
African trophies are unpleasantly reminiscent of the worst phase of British policy.” (Id., p. 22, quoting
Conway, M. (1882): Travels in South Kensington, London: Trubner, p. 71)
348 Barkan, 2002, p. 37
349 And, according to Lumley, in the origins of the debate in Britain, cultural heritage was indeed seen as
“primarily an attempt to avoid change by recalling nostalgic and romanticized presentations of the past.”
(Lumley, 2005, p. 15)
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because wherever they are, they are fulfilling the purpose of acting as a cultural
ambassador and educating and informing about the achievements of that culture. He denies
it is imperialistic, rather stating that the values advanced by the works of art are
irrespective of their location, whether in place of origin or elsewhere, that art always has
the same, altruistic function.350 In  his  words:  “[w]hen  I  see  the  obelisks  on  the  Thames
Embankment and in Central Park I see them not as loot, but as authentic tributes to the
majestic achievements of ancient Egypt, and appreciate them in their quite different but no
less evocative settings.”351 Of course, this does not take into account that to the Egyptian
(let alone to someone with more recent and more personal experience of appropriation of
art)  the  view  might  be  quite  different.  This  is  the  view  of  the  British  citizen  who  is  the
receiver of the object of art – one whose “own” cultural property is seen very little outside
its national borders. There is naturally a difference to be made between outspoken,
intentional imperialism, and an unintentional, perhaps structural imperialism. But in the
latter case, it can also be difficult to do away with altogether, if one is to still have such
institutions as the universal museums exist.352 And some institutions have taken steps to,
for example, involve the indigenous groups more in the institutions’ activity.
6. From Apology to Utopia
The previous two chapters have revealed a complex debate surrounding the restitution of
cultural property. The cultural property debate is built on two general viewpoints that have
strong principles behind them, and both sides have strong arguments to justify their point
and counter each other’s arguments, at the same time continuing the debate indefinitely.
Although both sides use rhetoric that implies that their point of view is based on the best
allocation of the objects in question, in truth neither side can escape from having real-
world politics infused in them. In order to understand why it seems that the debate is not
leading anywhere, I believe it is necessary to examine the debate in light of the theory of
international law as presented by Martti Koskenniemi in his work From Apology to Utopia.
The same kinds of patterns that define this view of international law also appear in the
cultural property debate. In addition, I believe this comparison reveals that the principles of
350 Boardman, 2000, pp. 257-260
351 Id., p. 259
352 And it is doubtful if anyone would actually wish for them not to exist, for they nevertheless hold great
benefits for all humankind.
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cultural nationalism and internationalism are not, in fact, as separate from each other as
they might appear and claim to be.
6.1. International Law
In From Apology to Utopia Martti Koskenniemi deals with the functioning of public
international law. After legal theorists gave up on traditional ways of justifying
(international) legal order, the descending arguments of law being derived (“descending”)
from  a  pre-existing  system  such  as  from  God  or  natural  law,  there  was  a  need  for  new
justifications and reasons for why law was compelling in general. The liberal doctrine,
then, came to try to fill this void. At first, the arguments were on the opposite side of the
descending arguments – they were “ascending”, based purely on the will of the subjects
and generalized from there. However, it was felt that this approach could not fully explain
how those subjects could still be restrained, and it was felt that international law should be
something separate from politics. So, descending elements were yet again added to the
theories. But this also created the problem that the justification was again reliant on the
descending patterns that the writers wished to do away with, which led to a kind of
pendulum swing in the theories, where neither argument could fully satisfy the liberal
view, but the ascending-descending explanations all had the problem of balancing.
Traditionally writers of international law have based their theories on the
foundation of either the doctrine of sources, or the doctrine of sovereignty. The same kind
of dichotomy is visible all throughout international legal argumentation, and in fact makes
international law not so much a legal system as a legal language, a way for the lawyer to
effectively argue any case.353 Or, put another way: “[i]nternational law is a structure of
argument patterns.”354 Each argument or position on one side can be flipped to the other
side, providing for an endless possibility for continuation of the international legal
speech.355
A  central  theme  of  the  book  is  the  interplay  of  apology  and  utopia  in
international law. Any viewpoint can be criticized for being either too apologetic (that is,
to simplify,  granting too much power and leeway to the actors of international law – the
353  ”... it is not an account of how legal decisions are made – it is about how they are justified in argument.
A grammar  is  not  a  description  of  what  native  language-speakers  say  in  fact  –  it  is  an  account  of what is
possible to say in that language.” (emphasis original) Koskenniemi, 2005, p. 589. See also pp. 566-573.
354 Rasulov, 2006, p. 353
355 Koskenniemi, 2005, pp. 1-15
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states) or utopian (being too idealistic and unrealizable in reality).356 The  opposition  will
then take the position from the other end of the spectrum to justify their viewpoint.
However, this opens it for the criticism on the other side. Basing one’s argumentation on
only one side makes the case too unreliable, as a truly acceptable position requires both
“ideological” and “realistic” (i.e. descending and ascending) support. Any strong case,
then, will require arguments of both types to be successful. But at the same time, the other
side will be using the same arguments as criticism and to make their own point. This leads
to an irresolvable situation, in which either side can keep arguing against the other side
indefinitely.357
Each proposed solution will remain vulnerable to criticisms which are justified by the
system itself. Morover [sic], depending on which of the system’s two contradictory
demands one is led to emphasize, different – indeed contradictory – solutions can be made
to seem equally acceptable.358
This argumentative cycle, then, cannot be broken from within the language of international
law. External factors must be brought into the decision-making process, in order to
produce a pragmatically plausible solution. This means focusing on the specific context of
the case and applying the facts of the case in order to bring a conclusion to the cycle. In
other words, international legal decisions are always political.359
As noted, this dualism is not limited to only this division of argument types,
but is rather visible all throughout the very foundations of international law, as well as the
theories of it. The view of international law as a language separates Koskenniemi’s theory
from those before that have seen international law as “just” another legal system, and in
fact includes them inside it as part of the use of the language of international law. They,
too, show the inherent dichotomy of the language. For example, each theory has always
based its opening to international law in either sovereignty or the sources of international
law – that is, whether the fundamental workings of the system are to be determined by the
will of the individual states or by the principles set in the sources of international law
(treaties etcetera). Still, merely sovereignty as the basis of international law in fact prevents
the true functioning of the system because it is inherently a violation of sovereign rights
and so doesn’t have to be followed (or, to put it another way, has nothing to oblige the
states to act accordingly and so collapses), and merely the sources as the basis still needs
356 Id., pp. 24-28
357 id., pp. 58-69
358 Id., p. 69
359 Id., pp. 588-589
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the sovereign states to be the agents, and forgets the real politics that often work differently
than the rules set in the sources.360 In  the  same way,  when looking  at  the  definition  and
birth of states, the starting point has been either the recognition of other states, or certain
characteristics of a state, set in the sources. But neither approach works alone.361
In here, too, we see apology and utopia in play. On the surface, the doctrines
of sovereignty are clearly apologetic, as they are reliant on the will of the states, and alone
would mean that anything the states say goes (as said, resulting in a lack of true
international law because the definition of sovereignty requires that the will of the
sovereign cannot be bound). The doctrines of sources are clearly utopian, because alone
they are mere wishes, and the reality does not actually perfectly follow the principles and
regulations defined in the sources (and alone would also result in a lack of true
international law because the sources require the cooperation of states). But then again, on
the  one  hand  the  idea  of  pure  sovereignty  is  utopian  as  it  is  not  possible  to  explain  all
sovereignty merely by factors of reality, and on the other hand for example the application
and interpretation of the sources require some actors, bringing yet again the accusation of
apology into play.362
6.2. Cultural Property debate
So, in short, international law is not in actuality like any legal order (that offers solutions to
(legal) issues), but rather a language – to give the tools for the actors to argue in any case.
This also applies to cultural nationalism and internationalism: although they are presented
as solutions to the problems of where to situate cultural property, in reality they are merely
the tools for argument regarding cultural property and cannot by themselves act as a tool
for deciding where a cultural object actually belongs.363
If one looks at the different arguments in the cultural internationalism versus
nationalism debate, it is not difficult to discover a similar structure of apology and utopia
in  it.  Perhaps  in  the  clearest  way,  the  nationalist  argument  is  the  ascending  and  so  the
apologistic one, while the internationalist argument is the descending, utopian one – after
360 Id., pp. 573-588. For a more in-depth analysis, see Id., pp. 224-302 on sovereignty and pp. 303- 387 on
sources.
361 Id., pp. 224-302
362 Id., pp. 300-303, 385-387
363 Of course, neither cultural nationalism nor internationalism is, or indeed can be, any more compelling an
argument in itself. In decision-making, the weight of an argument is a matter of choice – they don’t have any
inherent hierarchy by themselves.
76
all, the deciding factor for cultural nationalism is the will of the states, while cultural
internationalism uses argumentation regarding “higher” principles. Or, as put by Ana
Sljivic, when speaking in terms of the ideas of Duncan Kennedy: “nationalism and its basis
in state sovereignty is the ‘hard’ rhetoric; and internationalism, which elevates communal
concerns  and  forms  an  exception  of  sorts  to  the  dominant  nature  of  nation-states,  is  the
‘soft’ rhetoric.”364
Both these sides have received critique from the other side that can easily be
recognized as similar critique as that of apology and utopia in international legal discourse.
The critique that has been given from the internationalist side against the nationalist side
that the nationalistic ideology trivializes cultural property into an economic and political
tool for national gain, leaving no room for the good of the item itself (or its most utilitarian
use), is one such obvious accusation of apology. Similarly, the internationalist ideology is
criticized for ignoring real-world circumstances (such as the difficulty of travel for most
third-world citizens) and expecting things that simply are not feasible in the real world – an
accusation of utopianism. Also many critics point out that the museums, too, with their
universal goals and aspirations “do not – and arguably cannot – live up to these utopian
goals.”365
However, as has been stated, the discourse works in a way that also turns
each argument around, so that both sides uses both ascending and descending
argumentation, and can be criticized of being both apologetic and utopist. When we look at
the cultural nationalist side, although it is based on the idea of the home culture nation’s
rights and authority, it also proposes ideas that have been criticized as being too unrealistic
and utopian. For example, the many critiques regarding the protection of cultural property
(from both physical harm and theft) in poorer countries, the concern over accessibility of
the objects, as well as, in many ways, the fear of the domino effect of restitution can be
seen as critique to say that the true realization of such an idea of pure and universal cultural
nationalism is too implausible and would only work in a fictional utopia where all would
be safe and everyone would have easy access to anywhere in the world.
Similarly, there are many apologetic sides in the way cultural
internationalism is used in argument. Obvious is the way that the internationalists argue in
364 Sljivic, 1998, p. 430
365 Hoffman, 2010, p. 674
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terms of an item becoming the national heritage of the holding culture, too, once it has
been there long enough and had an impact – the usual example being the Parthenon
Sculptures becoming British cultural heritage. Here they are purely using the nationalistic
argument for their advantage. But also the actual internationalist arguments hold many
apologetic sides to them: most of the “higher” ideals of internationalism are in practice left
to  the  holding  countries  and  museums  to  decide  upon,  and  often  the  principles  of
protection  and  accessibility  are  used  in  such  a  way  that  purely  secures  the  holding
country’s possession – usually as decided by the holding country itself.366 In many ways
the internationalist idea, at least in practice, is an apology of imperialism. It is, as has been
mentioned, through a history of imperialism that a great deal of these objects have been
collected. And there might indeed be some imperialistic attitudes still lingering, as
suggested in the previous chapter. It could even be argued that for the objects to be best
seen in a comparative context – as is often suggested – is actually a context of imperialism,
as the method of acquisition for such collections is often purely imperial, and the selected
cultures in such a collection are chosen through an imperialistic mindset.
The truth is that neither cultural nationalism nor internationalism could
actually make a compelling case without arguments of both kinds. In the meanwhile, the
same kind of indeterminacy as characterizes international law characterizes also cultural
property debate: both sides’ conclusions are just as supportable by reason. In many ways,
both sides can be seen as merely background assumptions of each individual – something
that they inherently feel that is right – and to compel anyone to actually change their mind
about  such  an  assumption  requires  different  kinds  of  (strong)  arguments  to  back  up  the
presented viewpoints.367
All  –  or  at  least  most  –  participants  of  the  debate  seem  to  make  a  clear
distinction between cultural property and politics – much like is done in international law.
However, the truth is that such a distinction is a practical impossibility, as even the whole
definition of cultural property is a matter of politics, and it is clear that cultural property is
always used as a political instrument. At the same time, although there seems to be a desire
to see cultural property as something purely outside something as “mundane” or secular as
politics, almost all those in the debate have at least an element of it in the way they feel it
366 Not the least because the holding museums (especially in such cases as I have discussed) tend to be the
leading institutions in their respective fields.
367 For a very concise example of such both-sided argumentation, see Reppas, 1999, p.933
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should be decided upon. And, as has been apparent in the argumentation, it is almost a
practical impossibility to separate from politics, at least in the way that cultural property is
decided upon and understood now. Both sides also accuse the other side of reducing
cultural property to something menial and secular – already mentioned was the way
nationalism is accused of politicizing the matter, but in a similar way, internationalists are
sometimes accused of commodificating cultural property in their demands for a more free
international market.368
In a nutshell: the cultural property debate reveals a very similar
indeterminacy as is inherent in international law discourse. Because both sides can be
equally supported by reason and have equally compelling principles or ideals behind them,
one cannot (at least without subjective bias) place one side over the other. This is also why
both sides use also the other side’s arguments.
To some extent the similarities in the debate can, of course, be explained through the fact
that the cultural property debate is, in part, international legal debate. In purely legal terms,
the  problems are  a  question  of  international  law,  and  so  any  qualities  of  that  debate  will
also be visible in the cultural property debate. At the heart of the matter is the conflict
between the rights of two sovereigns. Both sides have their equally valid principles of
international law, and no such fundamental principles can be given true preference (if there
was such preference, the whole debate would be moot). The roots of the discussion are,
also, in the conflict of the (“secular”) sovereign power and higher (moral) principles. At
the same time there is  the presence of the inviolability of the rights of the sovereign and
their will to do as they will, but also of moral rules that do guide the actions of people and
sovereigns, but also cannot be clearly defined and can have subjective interpretation. The
moral side cannot be ignored, but it also cannot be given preference – for many reasons,
one of them being that there is never a true clarity as to what the “right” thing is. Although
many perhaps agree with the cultural nationalist that the correct location of a piece of
cultural property is with its home culture, the internationalist can just as convincingly ask
“why?”
One place where the “international law language” and “cultural property
language” seem to differ more clearly is their history. In international law, the situation
368 Prott, 2005, p. 228. Prott also relates this type of internationalism to cultural imperialism.
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was born from, so to say, a vertical conflict. The issue was the legitimization of the entire
international legal order, how its undeniable existence can be explained when neither the
ascending nor descending method is acceptable on their own. It is also quite purely an
intellectual dilemma (although with real-world implications). In this sense, the cultural
property issues rise from more horizontal conflicts. It is a history of attitudes and ideals
that develop over time when cultures have taken from other cultures. But when one looks
deeper into the history, there are also similarities present. In some ways, the verticality is
represented in the conflict of the actions of the sovereigns and the moral justification for
them, but more importantly, the development of the (essentially nationalist) ideals of every
nation’s right to their own cultural property is tied to the same development that led to the
liberal view in international law that inescapably determines its indeterminacy. This
development also shares the demands to separate the subject matter from politics.
7. Alternative Approaches
As already mentioned, for Koskenniemi the only way to escape the argumentation cycle
(that is, to decide an international case) is to bring external factors into the decision-
making. In cultural property debate, one way to escape the indeterminacy of the debate in
cultural property restitution is to (fundamentally) change the way that cultural property is
discussed – even to the extent of a paradigm shift. As the basic principles of the debate,
cultural nationalism and internationalism also include the indeterminacy as a fundamental
part of the debate. But although they are the established principles of understanding and
defining the subject matter, many have also suggested different other ways to understand
or  govern  cultural  property.  With  such  approaches,  it  might  be  possible  to  avoid  the
endless argumentation brought by the current circumstances. In this segment I will bring
forward some different approaches as presented by different authors and contemplate on if
and how they might break from the argumentation loop. Of course, whether there is a need
for such a break is a completely different matter that I am not trying to press for one way
or another. The point here is to see whether the alternative approaches could be a way
forward if such an action were deemed necessary.
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7.1. Cultural property as a non-renewable resource
Phyllis Mauch Messenger has presented the idea of approaching cultural property like a
non-renewable resource, or an endangered species. The essence of the idea is summarized
by Messenger:
So-called cultural properties are like environmentally endangered species. First, they are
non-renewable resources; once exhausted or destroyed, they cannot be replenished or
replaced. Second, they are not anyone’s property and no one can properly be said to own
them. Our relationship to them is more like that of a steward custodian, guardian,
conservator, or trustee than that of a property owner.369
This approach means that instead of focusing on who should gain the benefit from cultural
property, or who has the right to ownership, the focus should be on the preservation of the
objects, bearing in mind that “[t]heir protection and preservation is a collective
responsibility of all of us as stewards: it must acknowledge out important connection with
the past, be conducted with care and a sense of responsibility for peoples and their cultural
heritages, and respect for the context in which cultural remains are found.”370
With the non-renewable resource approach the whole terminology of the
debate changes. Because the ideas of property and ownership that generally are used in the
debate don’t perfectly fit anymore, it would be inappropriate to continue using those terms.
Messenger says that “a hierarchical model of conflict resolution simply is the wrong tool
for  the  job  if  what  one  is  trying  to  do  is  resolve  competing  claims  about  who  has  what
communal responsibilities of care regarding the preservation of cultural heritages.”371
What she suggests is an “integrative perspective” that focuses on the heritage-values of the
objects (concerns that have less to do with property rights and more with culture and the
importance of an object to the cultural identities), emphasizes preservation and understands
the people as stewards, not owners of the objects and takes into consideration “the
diversity of values and perspectives involved in the resolution of heritage issues.”372 To
her, this approach means resolving conflicts through alternative methods of conflict
resolution, as well as collaboration projects such as loans and joint studies.373
369 Warren, 1999b, p. 19
370 Id., p.19
371 Id., pp. 19-20
372 Id., pp. 20-21
373 Id., pp. 19-22
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While this approach certainly would mean a distinct difference to the very
nation-oriented debate, it might not mean a complete change from the current situation. For
one,  this  approach  still  doesn’t  suggest  a  clearly  different  way  to  solve  the  problem  of
where to situate the objects, and more importantly still focuses on a few key principles that
are central in the internationalism-nationalism debate, especially the preservation principle.
This way, nations still have ways of continuing the debate loop for their own benefit with
some of the same tools as are in use now. The most important point in this approach is,
however, that it would mean a shift away from thinking about cultural property in terms of
ownership, but rather in terms of more utilitarian values. However, this is such a great step
to take that it is questionable how successful it could really be. But were it to be successful,
it would mean an great change in the cultural property debate.
7.2. Cultural property as Nietzschean aphorism
Tatiana Flessas has likened cultural property to an aphorism in the thinking of Friedrich
Nietzsche. Unlike the previous approach, this is a way of defining cultural property
(instead of a new approach to the functions and meaning of cultural property), and unlike
usual definitions of cultural property – especially those in the legal instruments – it does
not focus on the physical features of the actual objects, but rather “the approach taken ... is
to  look  at  the  values  that  these  definitions  embody in  order  to  understand  the  difference
between ‘cultural property’ [and the objects] not protected by these legal instruments.”374
In all such definitions, there is always a “gap” for some value that is unexplainable and still
integral.375
According to Flessas, “it becomes clear that the definitions of cultural
property turn on the valorization and preservation of life, all sorts of life and all sorts of
evidence of life.”376 In this sense, in the core of the cultural property is the interpretation
that they evoke in the observer, and to Flessas this interpretation should be performed with
the tools from the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, and his works regarding the values of
values. The defining gain in cultural property is the acquirement of self-knowledge, but the
objects never fully satisfy this desire:
374 Flessas, 2003, p. 1068. It should be noted that such a brief overview of the subject at hand cannot in full
convey the original ideas in the full, and as such should not be viewed as an ideal summarization.
375 Id., p. 1073
376 Id., p. 1068
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[T]he knowledge that is derived via the route of acquiring or studying cultural property will
never be enough to satisfy its “seekers”. Fundamentally, it cannot meet the intensity or
“truth” of the experience that is generated by, or packed into, the object or practice. ... The
object/practice at issue cannot contain the knowledge sought; it is the space and the
direction of the (desired) knowing that the cultural property opens up to and represents that
must be liberated in order to understand the cultural property disputes. The para-rational
investment in the object must be reconciled, within the language of the definition of
cultural property, with the imperative of modern culture.377
Ultimately, “the cultural property functions a puzzle, creating, as well as accessing a/the
place of interpretation, which is an interpretation in itself.”378 This is one principal way in
which cultural property is a metaphor, and, according to Flessas, a Nietzschean metaphor
in particular.379
Finally,  the  Nietzschean  metaphor  extends  to  the  way  that  we  deal  with
cultural property. The definition of (and the struggle to define) cultural property has arisen
from a situation of destruction, looting and theft of cultural property, and a culture where
“commentators fall back on the core self-justifying belief or principle in Western thought
that the true owners of a culture are the people that preserve it.”380
In a landscape of assured loss ... the highest expression of ownership rights now requires
that the true owner desire the culture’s (or object’s) preservation above all.381
However, this leads the culture to a state of stasis – something that, according to Flessas,
observers (who are not part of the culture) value, but the participants in that culture do not.
By placing preservation above all, “then to make a claim regarding cultural property, and
to do so using the law, is already to exist in a state of bad consciousness.”382 This way is to
maintain dead things, a Necropolis, where nothing is discarded but also not allowed “life”
through continued use (and reinvention of the (always subjective) interpretation of (self-
)knowledge). This also means that those who preserve things also remove any other
choices from others, and “[t]here is only one way to value culture; there is only one correct
posture for experiencing ‘life.’”383
The value of these objects should be diluted by the constant expansion of the field, yet it is
the value of the values expressed in the definition of cultural property that becomes faint or
377 Id., p. 1078
378 Id., p. 1079 (emphasis original)
379 Id., pp. 1079-1082
380 Id., p. 1092 (emphasis original)
381 Id., pp. 1092-1093
382 Id., p. 1093
383 Id., pp. 1088-1094
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vague against the backdrop of a plethora of things. In a world of increasingly preserved and
“valuable” things, it is not clear any more why they are valuable.384
Because the Nietzschean aphorism approach is actually a way to define
cultural  property  instead  of  a  new approach  to  what  to  do  with  it  or  how to  govern  it,  it
wouldn’t necessarily mean that it actually changes anything in the restitution-retention
debate. However, because it is such a fundamentally different way of assessing cultural
property, and especially because it compels the evaluation of life of the objects in question,
it also forces one to rethink their approach to the way in which we preserve and utilize the
property. If a museum is a Necropolis of dead things, then perhaps there is a need to have
some of the objects back in a life where they’re in use, with the wisdom and knowledge
that  they  represent  put  in  practice,  as  well  as  newly  infused  to  them.  Flessas  also  has  an
interesting point into the way nationalism and internationalism function:
Knowledge of life continues to be the “object” of cultural property instruments, but it is
knowledge already possessed rather than knowledge which is missing or lost that  is  at
issue. In cultural nationalism, the underlying relationship to (the value of) knowledge is
one of having rather than needing. All that is needed is the object that expresses the
knowledge. In cultural internationalism, the object underwrites knowledge that might
otherwise be “lost” or withheld, knowledge that is directly relevant to the past/future of “all
mankind” or to human beings in an evolutionary sense.385
7.3. Cultural pragmatism
According to Matthew R. Hoffman, in the last decade or so “[t]he museum community
recognized that the debate between cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism had
become counter-productive and offensive to many source countries”386 which led to the
development of a position (mainly inside the (American) museum community) he refers to
as cultural pragmatism. The idea is to find a middle-ground between cultural nationalism
and internationalism, through enhanced collaboration and respect between source countries
and the countries and museums that hold the objects. In this way, the museums respect the
source countries’ right to protect their own cultural property, but also the countries respect
the work the museums do that enhances knowledge and appreciation for the objects and the
cultures responsible for them.387
384 Id., p. 1094
385 Id., p. 1080, footnote 44
386 Hoffman, 2010, p. 685
387 Id., pp. 685-686
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The idea is that both sides would make compromises to accommodate all the
relevant parties’ needs, including not only the museums and source countries, but also
especially the licit market of cultural property (in order to weaken the illicit market and all
the damage it causes). Hoffman also suggests that states turn to the much praised Japanese
model of cultural property protection, where there are different tiers (each with a different
level of control) for cultural property of differing national importance, instead of the often
extremely strict and one-sided cultural property laws now widely used. The states would be
allowed to have an adjustment period where they would adapt their more strict restrictions
into the new model (and assigning more cultural property than needed into the strictest
controlled categories), and later when the supply and demand were manageable, would
lower less-important objects into the more open categories.388
As an approach to cultural property, cultural pragmatism is, as its name
suggests,  a  very  sensible  one.  It  is  positive  that  the  initiative  for  it  has  come  from  the
American museums, so it is clear that it should be acceptable even wider in the museum
community. Of course, the functioning of this approach depends heavily on the goodwill of
the parties. Both the museums and the source countries would, in effect, have to let go of
some of their claims to their cultural property and would have to trust that the other parties
would keep true to the collaborations in good faith. The licit market of cultural property is
also a slightly unknown factor – many believe that the greater acknowledgement of it
would stem the tide of illicit trade, but there is no guarantee and there are those who would
disagree. Of course, with the Japanese model the states would at least have a better say in
what is acceptable to be let into the marketplace (but at the same time there would have to
be a considerable amount of objects for the demand to be reasonably satisfied). There is
also the question of how much leeway cultural pragmatism in action would still leave for
the parties – if there was much that were left to them to still decide on, there would always
be the potential for the debate to simply continue as it is now. As an approach, cultural
pragmatism doesn’t exactly do away with nationalism and internationalism, it simply tries
to bring them closer together – which might not be as difficult a feat as it may seem due to
the way both sides in fact rely on the same argumentations, as shown in the previous
chapter. Either way, it is likely that more collaboration between the museums and source
countries would benefit both of them, even if the debate surrounding cultural property did
not change.
388 Id., pp. 685-692; summary of the Japanese model at pp. 689-690.
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8. Conclusion
It would seem that nothing is quite simple when it comes to cultural property. Starting
from the fact that the term itself does not – and most likely cannot – have a set,
unambiguous definition, cultural property continues to invoke a passionate response from
all those involved with it. We can see in the history of cultural property that there is
something inherent about it that goes beyond what you can simply reason with a very
categorical approach.  Be it the mana that Merryman has spoken of, or the “gap” in the
Nietzschean aphorism, cultural property continues to invoke the passions and emotions of
people  as  it  has  for  as  long  as  we  have  records  of  history.  And  cultural  property  is  not
something  that  matters  on  just  a  personal  level  –  it  is  also  essentially  tied  with  the
communities and other ties that bind people together, be it on a very intimate or a universal
and global level.
The history of cultural property shows that there has always been that
inherent mana about art (and cultural property overall), something that has made it seem
special and extraordinary and, indeed, even worth waging war over. Part of its sanctity also
comes from the fact that art was in Antiquity almost exclusively religious. There has been
a slow but constant change in the way art has been viewed in society – the Romans were
the  first  to  institutionalize  its  plunder  as  an  integral  part  of  warfare;  coming  to  the  17th
century art had become a part of the private splendor and might of the sovereign, but
started to again change into a public thing – but this time something especially national –
during and after the French Revolution; and finally starting with the aftermath of the Battle
of Waterloo, it began to be widely seen as something so inherently belonging to the people
of  origin  that  plunder  came  to  be  a  war  crime,  and  even  war  reparations  were  not  to  be
taken from the cultural property of the people. This is illustrated by the fact that the 30
Years’ War was, indeed, the last case where the plunder of art in war (in a large scale)
would go without redress. In all following cases – be it Napoleon or Hitler – there would
be an effort by the victors to return all art that was taken to the place they were taken from,
and finally after World War II to even judicially sentence those responsible for it.
The emotional charge in cultural property is obvious when looking at the
restitution debate. It also exemplifies how fundamentally certain inherent background
assumptions can alter the way we see the same situation. Neither the nationalist nor the
internationalist side can argue that their point of view is any more fundamental or natural
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than the other. Which side one feels more justified is, in fact, an unconscious personal
choice, born from all the cultural and other factors that define a person and their opinions.
That is also an important reason why a person arguing for either the retention or restitution
of cultural property needs to use – even if somewhat secretly – both nationalist and
internationalist arguments: it is extremely difficult to change someone’s opinion on them,
so it is rather better to try to invoke also the other side into one’s argumentation.
It is also clear that cultural property and the debate surrounding it cannot be
free of infusion with politics and other such secular issues. As something extremely
valuable and emotive, it is unavoidable that actors in the debate will consider every
advantage that cultural property can have. Obvious are the economic gains for even an
entire nation when they can hold iconic pieces of cultural property, but irrefutable are also
the myriad of political uses that cultural property can have – be it gaining popularity,
invoking communal emotion, populist rhetoric or shining a spotlight away from things one
wishes to hide. There are also countless way to interpret the matters surrounding the debate
– to one displaying cultural property is a grand celebration of the achievements of
humanity, to another it is an expression of imperialism. That is due to the indeterminate
nature of both cultural property and imperialism.
The discussion also is highly unlikely to disappear. Nations are not going to
give up trying to secure what they feel is their cultural heritage and property that belongs to
them, and no one can also deny the advantages (for everyone) that the universal museums
have. The debate will also follow along the same paths, as made sure by the argument
patterns that strongly reflect those that can be found in international law as presented by
Koskenniemi. It is almost surprising how strongly the discourse in cultural property
functions like the international law discourse, with, for example, clear arguments of
apology and utopia and the reversibility of arguments. Although in some ways the cultural
property debate is a part of the international law discourse, this parallel cannot alone
explain why the debate functions in the same way also on the non-legal side. The full
debate is also alike in that it pits against each other principles that are, in fact, useable for
either side of the debate, features the conflict of sovereign power and perceived higher
moral principles and shares some similarities in the historical development of the liberal
view, such as the (attempted) escape from politics. Perhaps the biggest difference is simply
in the fact that in cultural property debate, the principles stay the same, and those who
argue for them rarely change perspectives, unlike international lawyers.
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A paradigm shift may be needed in order to steer away from this endless
argumentation cycle in cultural property debate, but whether such a change is needed is
another matter. Perhaps not – although as the discussion is now, due to the emotional
impact of cultural property on peoples everywhere, it does create negativity between those
who possess these objects and those who want them back. But since both sides already lean
on both types of arguments, perhaps there is some hope of a middle-ground being found.
According to Koskenniemi, the argumentation cycle in international law can only be ended
by applying external facts into the case. In the matter of cultural property debate, such a
change may perhaps be brought on by approaching cultural property overall from a
different angle.
In recent decades – to some degree starting with UNESCO 1970 – the scales
have been balancing more in favor of cultural nationalism, the restitution movement and
especially the rights of indigenous peoples to their cultural property. Usually parties try to
avoid taking the cases to court, as the process would be extremely expensive and
cumbersome, and the resulting judgment somewhat unpredictable. That is why, for
example, mediation and other modes of alternative dispute resolution have been brought
forth and preferred as a better alternative.389 However, as some of the cases as well as the
presented alternative approaches have shown, there is good hope for ways completely
outside the legal system to settle such disputes. The Icelandic Manuscripts case was settled
through diplomatic negotiations, and as the American museums’ new pragmatic approach
has shown, there is a possibility to find a middle-ground between the interests of the
restitutionists and retentionists, or nationalists and internationalists. If such a middle-
ground were to be found through improved co-operation between the different actors –
museums, nations, communities etcetera – and the required goodwill and trust found, it
could mean benefits for everyone involved, as well as the chance for the requirements of
both parties to be met. For example, loan programs could mean both that the iconic works
of a certain culture, currently on display in a foreign nation, would be available on display
in its home culture, and that works could be allowed to tour the world so that the cultural
property is accessible to all the people in the world, as required by cultural
internationalism. But perhaps true change to the debate can only be achieved through a
complete shake-up of the fundamentals of the concept of cultural property.
389 See for example Mealy, 2011; Cornu & Renold, 2010; Ounanian, 2007
